Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis
For many years historians of the Cuban missile crisis have concentrated on those thirteen days in October 1962 when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Mark White's study adds an equally intense scrutiny of the causes and consequences of the crisis. Missiles in Cuba is based on up-to-date scholarship as well as Mr. White's own findings in National Security Archive materials, Kennedy Library tapes of ExComm meetings, and correspondence between Soviet officials in Washington and Havana—all newly released. His more rounded picture gives us a much clearer understanding of the policy strategies pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, Cuba) that brought on the crisis. His almost hour-by-hour account of the confrontation itself also destroys some venerable myths, such as the unique initiatives attributed to Robert Kennedy. And his assessment of the consequences of the crisis points to salutary effects on Soviet-American relation and on U.S. nuclear defense strategy, but questionable influences on Soviet defense spending and on Washington's perception of its talents for "crisis management," later tested in Vietnam.
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Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis
For many years historians of the Cuban missile crisis have concentrated on those thirteen days in October 1962 when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Mark White's study adds an equally intense scrutiny of the causes and consequences of the crisis. Missiles in Cuba is based on up-to-date scholarship as well as Mr. White's own findings in National Security Archive materials, Kennedy Library tapes of ExComm meetings, and correspondence between Soviet officials in Washington and Havana—all newly released. His more rounded picture gives us a much clearer understanding of the policy strategies pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, Cuba) that brought on the crisis. His almost hour-by-hour account of the confrontation itself also destroys some venerable myths, such as the unique initiatives attributed to Robert Kennedy. And his assessment of the consequences of the crisis points to salutary effects on Soviet-American relation and on U.S. nuclear defense strategy, but questionable influences on Soviet defense spending and on Washington's perception of its talents for "crisis management," later tested in Vietnam.
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Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis

Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis

by Mark J. White
Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis

Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis

by Mark J. White

eBook

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Overview

For many years historians of the Cuban missile crisis have concentrated on those thirteen days in October 1962 when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Mark White's study adds an equally intense scrutiny of the causes and consequences of the crisis. Missiles in Cuba is based on up-to-date scholarship as well as Mr. White's own findings in National Security Archive materials, Kennedy Library tapes of ExComm meetings, and correspondence between Soviet officials in Washington and Havana—all newly released. His more rounded picture gives us a much clearer understanding of the policy strategies pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, Cuba) that brought on the crisis. His almost hour-by-hour account of the confrontation itself also destroys some venerable myths, such as the unique initiatives attributed to Robert Kennedy. And his assessment of the consequences of the crisis points to salutary effects on Soviet-American relation and on U.S. nuclear defense strategy, but questionable influences on Soviet defense spending and on Washington's perception of its talents for "crisis management," later tested in Vietnam.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781461713050
Publisher: Dee, Ivan R. Publisher
Publication date: 02/01/1998
Series: American Ways
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 182
File size: 753 KB

About the Author

Mark J. White teaches American history at Eastern Illinois University. He has edited The Kennedys and Cuba: The Declassified Documentary History and other studies in American diplomatic history.

Table of Contents

Part 1 Preface ix
Part 2 BACKGROUND TO CRISIS 3
Chapter 3 Policy toward Cuba in the pre-Kennedy years. JFK's political backgroud and foreign policy views. 1960 presidential campaign and its aftermath. Bay of Pigs. Military contingency plans. Operation Mongoose. CIA attempts to assassinate Castro. JFK's use of di
Part 4 THE SOCIETS ACT: OPERATION ANADYR 30
Chapter 5 Why Khrushchev placed nuclear weapons in Cuba. Castro's motives for accepting the missles. The start of Operation Anadyr.
Part 6 AN AUTUMN OF DISCONTENT 56
Chapter 7 Soviet outlook and strategy in the fall of 1962. Cuban hints that missles were being sent. Republican attacks on kennedy. Congressional and media pressure. Role played by U.S. intelligence. JFK's public stance on Cuba. Jupiter missles in Turkey. Accelerat
Part 8 WEEK ONE: HOW TO RESPOND 79
Chapter 9 Day-by-day in the crisis, from the day JFK was informed that nuclear weapons were in Cuba until the day he announced his intention to blocade the island.
Part 10 WEEK TWO: HOW TO DEFUSE 107
Chapter 11 Day-by-day, examining the road to a settlement.
Part 12 AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION 146
Chapter 13 Problems in implementing the settlement. Long-term impact of the missile crisis. Conclusions.
Part 14 A Note on Sources 157
Part 15 Index 165
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