Severance taxes-taxes levied upon the production of oil and natural gas-have long been popular with state governments. Such taxes are thought to have minimal impact upon the areas where petroleum wells are located, the costs of such taxes can be "exported" to a large and dispersed consumer base in other states, and an oil or gas well can not be moved to another state where taxes are lower. Because of these factors, severance taxes seem like "ideal" taxes for legislators to impose.

But how do severance taxes work in the real world? Are they really as "painless" as they sound? Because of the immobility of the resource being taxed, do states tend to overtax? In this provocative study, the authors survey state severance taxes and find they tend to lower petroleum production, reduce jobs in the states imposing such taxes, and have negative effects that can ripple throughout a state's economy.

Author Biography: Robert Deacon, Stephen DeCanio, H. E. Frech III, and the late M. Bruce Johnson have all been Professors of Economics at the University of California at Santa Barbara. M. Bruce Johnson was the founding Research Director of The Independent Institute.