In 2001 and in 2003 the United States Army, along with coalition forces demonstrated their conventional superiority by routing the forces of the Taliban and the Iraqi Army. Since those conventional victories, determining success has not been so clear. How does a COIN commander know he is winning? US military doctrine addresses the need to construct measures of effectiveness, but does not offer any universal metrics applicable to COIN.
To determine if there are any reasonable, universal metrics, this monograph looks to COIN theorists, COIN doctrine and COIN researchers. The proposed metrics include body count, violence reduction, actionable intelligence, popular attitude, popular behavior, resource reduction, and subjective assessments. Each metric has shortcomings unless linked to a reduction of tangible resources.
Counterinsurgency in practice reveals that reducing tangible recourses is the surest path to victory in COIN.
Measuring tangible resource reduction is possible and efficient if the process mirrors the intelligence collection process. The staff must identify indicators of the trend in insurgent resources instead of tasking elements to look for and destroy resources. The indicators are environmentally dependant but typically include size of attack, solicitation for sponsorship, equipment characteristics, and insurgent interaction with population.