A War Too Far: Iran, Iraq, and the New American Century

by Paul Rogers

Overview

There are few today who can claim that the US occupation of Iraq has been a success, for Iraq or the US. A War Too Far takes this on by looking back on the many unanswered questions about the invasion itself. What was the real reason for the Iraq War? Did George Bush ever have a strategy to confront al-Qaida in one arena? How does the invasion alter Iraq's relationship with Iran? And what does this mean for the future?

World-renowned security expert Paul Rogers tackles these questions, offering a uniquely insightful analysis of events during and after the war. Examining the delicate balance of power in Iraq, he explores the options for a US exit strategy, and how the invasion affects America's relationship with Iran.

Paul Rogers predicted in 2000 that the US would experience a terrorist attack on its own soil. Subsequent events proved how accurate he was. This book is required reading for students, journalists, policy-makers and anyone interested in getting the whole story about the dangerous consequences of the latest American venture in the Middle East.

Paul Rogers explores:

- The neo-conservative vision of a US-dominated Middle East
- The oil link – Iraq's significance in energy geopolitics
- Links with Israel – the development of close military cooperation between the US and Israeli military
- The growing possibility of a war on Iran and its potential repercussions

Praise for Paul Rogers's previous book Iraq and the War on Terror:

"Incisive, elegant, profound: if you want to understand what happened and why, you should start here."
- George Monbiot

"Paul Rogers is a secular prophet for our troubled age. This analysis should be required reading in the Pentagon."
- David Loyn, BBC

"Paul Rogers has proved himself, time and again, to be a dispassionate analyst of events in Iraq...this is a must read."
- Tom Walker, The Sunday Times

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780745324326
Publisher:	Pluto Press
Publication date:	02/13/2006
Pages:	320
Product dimensions:	5.32(w) x 8.47(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Paul Rogers is Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University where he teaches courses on international security and political violence. He lectures at universities and defence colleges in several countries and his publications include 26 books. He regularly appears on radio and television.

Read an Excerpt

CHAPTER 1

War

INTRODUCTION

When the war started in March 2003, there was a high expectation that the 'shock and awe' bombing tactics and a sense of liberation from most ordinary Iraqis would lead to a very rapid collapse of the regime followed by an early transition to peace and stability. Some of the problems experienced early in the campaign, including adverse weather and attacks on supply routes by irregular forces, resulted in a degree of consternation and critical analysis in some sectors of the media. That was quickly forgotten when the regime collapsed within three weeks, the overall view being that the pulling down of the statue of Saddam Hussein near the centre of Baghdad was the iconic demonstration of the success of the US forces and their coalition partners.

In the Open Democracy analyses reprinted here, a different view was taken right from the start, and within a few days of the outbreak of the war some of the comments were suggesting a protracted conflict that might stretch over a number of years. This view was predicated on the probability that there would be an organised guerrilla resistance centred on the Special Republican Guard, and that US forces would find urban conflict particularly difficult. With the benefit of hindsight, the analysis has proved to be wrong in one sense and right in most others.

It was wrong in suggesting that the regime as a whole would survive for many weeks or even months, but it quickly became apparent that units of the Special Republican Guard largely melted away rather than take on the overwhelming firepower of the US forces. Because of this, the regime itself collapsed, although many elements of the leadership evaded initial capture, and there were indications of some initial resistance to occupation within days of the taking of Baghdad.

In other respects, the analysis has proved sadly accurate in predicting a long-lasting conflict that would be costly to the United States and its coalition partners and even more so to tens of thousands of ordinary Iraqis. Its consistent focus during these first three weeks of the war on casualties has also proved apposite, given what is now known about the thousands of civilians killed in that period alone. It also correctly highlighted incidents of suicide bombings that occurred right at the start of the war and have, since then, become a major feature of the insurgency.

At the time, the fall of the regime was greeted with great enthusiasm within the Bush administration, and there were frequent suggestions that the more pessimistic analysts and commentators had been proved wrong. The achievement of the New American Century was on course, and diversions from this aim were highly unlikely. As the following accounts suggest, though, even at the height of this brief phase of the war, there were all too many signs that this was to be an entirely false prospect.

THE QUICKSAND OF WAR 24 March 2003

The first indication of the unexpected nature of the war with Iraq came just a few hours into the ground invasion. At about 05.30 (London time) on 21 March, the BBC's 24-hour news channel called up one of its correspondents, Adam Mynott, who was with a group of US soldiers as they crossed the border from Kuwait into Iraq.

Whereas other reports had indicated rapid progress of US and British troops, Mynott came on air breathless from having to take cover as the convoy he was with faced up to small arms and rocket attack from Iraqi forces. It was clearly unexpected, and gave the first indication that the Iraqi resistance to the invasion would be fierce.

Umm Qasr

Four days on, US troops are still trying to defeat a group of Iraqi soldiers in the port of Umm Qasr, and substantial British troop deployments are stuck outside of Basra. While the major US forces are moving rapidly up the Tigris/Euphrates valley towards Baghdad, what is happening in south-east Iraq is highly significant.

According to informed sources just before the war started, one of the first major ground campaigns would be the liberation of Basra, Iraq's second city and a centre for the Shi'a population that had been treated so badly by the Saddam Hussein regime.

As a New York Times article put it, 'a successful and "benign" occupation that results in flag-waving crowds hugging British and American soldiers will create an immediate positive image worldwide of American and British war aims while also undermining Iraqi resistance elsewhere in the country'. Five days into the war, and with US forces facing substantial resistance in several towns and cities, the liberation of Basra is still awaited.

This may seem a small sign, but it is important in the context of the expectation that this would be a straightforward war of liberation for the Iraqi people, with the US demonstrating such firepower and determination that the regime would fall within days – or that there would, at minimum, be massive desertions and surrenders, with resistance limited to a hard core of regime supporters.

It is still possible that the regime will collapse in the next few days, but the least that can be said now is that it seems unlikely. Moreover, whereas resistance was expected in Baghdad, one surprise to invading forces has been the frequent problems posed by small numbers of Iraqi forces operating in areas remote from the regime's control, and possibly not even in communication with Baghdad.

A Conflict of Surprises

Any attempt to predict the further development of the war is highly risky, but there are three significant indicators of the unfolding character of the war.

The first is that the bombing of Baghdad, while intensive, has not been on the overwhelming scale expected by many analysts and predicted by US administration officials. Most of the attacks have been directed at narrow military targets, including command and control centres; civilian casualties have been relatively low, at least during the first four nights.

A likely reason for this relative restraint is the necessity of limiting the political impact of civilian casualties. The British prime minister Tony Blair is in an especially vulnerable political position, and even within the Bush administration there will be some idea of the extent of international opposition to the war (although its sheer intensity is largely unreported by the US and UK media).

The second indicator is that the US war plan calls for a very rapid advance towards Baghdad by the equivalent of three divisions numbering perhaps 60,000 troops. This is not actually a very large force and the advance is dependent on secure supply lines and overwhelming use of firepower against any opposition facing the advancing forces.

The use of multiple launch rocket systems, cluster bombs and other area impact weapons is almost certainly causing many deaths and serious injuries among Iraqi conscripts. This is speeding the advance, but does not address the serious security problem presented by small Iraqi units that choose to engage US forces only after the main advance has gone through.

Something similar is happening around Basra, and a picture is now starting to emerge of a risk of guerrilla activity in the coming days, with actions aimed at the more lightly-armed US and British troops that are deployed behind the main advances.

The third indicator is the civilian context of the military campaign. US troops are, unsurprisingly, simply not being welcomed in the way that was confidently expected in Washington, as liberators. There are several possible factors involved here: memories of the failure of the US to support the Shi'a revolt in 1991, the effectiveness of regime propaganda, the underlying force of Iraqi nationalism.

In the light of the military setbacks of the first days of the war, it is possible that the US may yet return to the 'shock and awe' bombing tactics that were originally expected, whatever their wider political consequences.

A New Timetable?

After five days of war, the regime in Baghdad still seems in control, US forces are moving towards the city, Iraqi resistance is stronger than expected and the whole war is becoming steadily more complex.

There are other complicating factors. Turkish involvement in northern Iraq and Israeli action in Lebanon are both possible, and the US is simultaneously involved in a substantial military operation in Afghanistan.

A quick war with few casualties looks increasingly unlikely. There could be dramatic changes but the second Gulf war seems likely to last not days, but weeks or even months.

A LONG OR A SHORT WAR? 27 March 2003

After eight days of war in Iraq, there is growing evidence that the campaign is not going the way the US and Britain wanted or expected. The situation remains very fluid, with an enormous amount of misinformation coming from both sides.

One way to try and make some sense of it is to examine the range of possible outcomes. On this basis, and on a best estimate, there were at the outset of war five ways in which it could have been expected to go to a conclusion. Each outcome had a different duration, ranging from one-to-two weeks to a year or more. These will be examined in turn.

The First Outcome: 'Shock and Awe'

The 'shock and awe' tactic of massive bombing of the Iraqi leadership and military causes the immediate collapse of the regime, and the assassination of Saddam Hussein, with little or no fighting on the ground. Duration: 3-5 days.

While events have already made this estimate redundant, a version of it is still just possible over a longer timescale, especially if the US returns to the intensive city-centre bombing of the third night of the war and succeeds in destroying the Iraqi leadership, including Saddam Hussein himself. It remains unlikely, partly because the US is limited in its bombing campaign by the need to avoid civilian casualties, and because the Iraqi leadership is both dispersed and well protected.

The Second Outcome: Quick Victory

The leadership survives the initial bombing, coalition troops move rapidly towards Baghdad, unimpeded by Iraqi forces. In southern cities they are welcomed and there are anti-regime rebellions. The Republican Guard is engaged and defeated, largely by air power, outside of Baghdad, and the Special Republican Guard disperses. Baghdad is occupied with little conflict. The regime collapses. Duration: 1-3 weeks.

This is still possible but frankly very unlikely. There has been surprisingly little welcome for coalition troops. Basra was expected to be liberated within a couple of days but remains in regime hands. US troops are being harried by militia and fedayeen and neither they nor the British have achieved full control of south-east Iraq. The regime appears firmly in control in Baghdad. There has been little in the way of rebellion.

There is now some evidence that the Republican Guard is willing to fight, contrary to the expectations of many analysts who saw the much smaller Special Republican Guard as being the main problem for the US. The Republican Guard has forces deeply protected south of Baghdad and is subject to intensive bombing, but some units repelled a substantial air attack by US Apache helicopters earlier this week, bringing one and possibly two down and damaging many more, much to the surprise of US commanders. Attacks against extended supply lines from Kuwait towards Baghdad are causing problems. The weather has not helped.

The Third Outcome: Slow Victory

The Republican Guard fights but is defeated. The Special Republican Guard is eventually defeated in Baghdad. There are limited uprisings. The regime collapses with thousands of military casualties and hundreds of civilians killed. Duration: 4-8 weeks.

This is certainly still possible, but would require substantial US reinforcements into southern Iraq accompanied by air-lifted troops to open a new front north of Baghdad, splitting Iraqi defences. Both may now be happening, but heavy resistance by the Special Republican Guard and Iraqi Special Forces could lead to substantial US casualties. The regional and international political impact would be considerable, with the anti-American and anti-British mood increasing greatly.

The Fourth Outcome: Long War

The Republican Guard fights outside Baghdad first and then retreats to pre-prepared defensive positions in the suburbs. There is an eventual defeat but the Special Republican Guard, fedayeen and other forces fight on for weeks in the city. Substantial further US reinforcements are called in and there is consistent use of heavy firepower in the city during a siege in which US forces slowly encroach on the centre. They eventually occupy Baghdad and destroy the regime but not without even higher civilian casualties. The US is unable to succeed by the end of May; the war slows down through the heat of the summer until the autumn. Duration: up to 8 months.

This is quite possible and would be a humanitarian disaster. It would also have huge political implications for George Bush and would threaten Tony Blair's position. The regional and international impact of sustained warfare in an ancient Arab city, as well as considerable loss of civilian life, would further intensify anti-American and anti-British feelings across the region, with unpredictable consequences.

The Fifth Outcome: Defeat

This is an extension of the previous outcome, except that the elite Iraqi forces and irregular guerrilla groups tie down US forces for an extended period, with the regime surviving through next winter. There is instability in several Arab states as popular sentiments require support for Iraq. This instability is compounded by harsh action by Ariel Sharon's Israeli government in southern Lebanon following missile attacks directed at Haifa. US and UK forces in the region are subject to paramilitary attacks. A messy ceasefire is eventually agreed under UN auspices, and the UN takes a leading role in trying to restore some sense of stability in the face of many tens of thousands of casualties and a wrecked Iraq. Duration: uncertain.

The Probable Outcome

At present the US and Britain are obliged to face up to something between a slow victory and a long war. The extent of Iraqi guerrilla actions has come as a surprise, but even more remarkable has been the ability of Iraqi forces to inflict damage on US equipment, most notably the response to the Apache helicopter attack.

Although there could still be a sudden and rapid collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, this looks decreasingly likely. One consequence is that the US plan for a rapid march on Baghdad using relatively light but highly mobile forces is proving difficult to carry out.

At the same time, we should not underestimate the absolute determination of the Bush administration to succeed in terminating the Iraqi regime. If there were any prospect of the war dragging on into the summer, there would be a major intensification of US operations in late April and May.

'Defeat', the fifth option, is utterly unthinkable. If it were to happen, it would destroy not just the US strategy for the region, threatening its control of Gulf oil, but would fatally damage the whole Project for the New American Century that lies at the heart of the neo-conservative security agenda in Washington.

A CHANGE OF STRATEGY? 31 March 2003

The US war plan in Iraq depended on massive air bombardments and rapid movements of ground troops towards Baghdad to bring the regime to its knees, possibly in a matter of days and certainly in a very few weeks. The war in Iraq is not going according to this plan. The main reason is simple: the strategy was flawed from the start, and has been further thrown off course by short-term surprises and specific failures.

A Shifting Timetable

The US military planners had originally hoped to begin the war towards the end of March, when all of its intended troop deployments were to have been completed.

Three factors disrupted this. First, the reluctance of the UN Security Council to accede to pressure over a possible second resolution (as a follow-up to Resolution 1441) influenced the decision to launch the war a few days earlier than planned.

Second, the refusal of the Turkish parliament to allow US troops to move through Turkey into northern Iraq refocused attention on the southern front, with US planners believing that there would be sufficient US forces in Kuwait by around 26 March to begin the war from that direction alone.

These two events led war planners to bring the schedule forward by several days, probably to the night of 21-22 March. In turn, however, that was changed again in the light of credible intelligence reports locating Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders at a leadership compound in the vicinity of one of the homes of Saddam Hussein's younger son (and leader of the Republican Guard), Qusay.

At short notice, and at least two full days before the intended start of the war, President Bush authorised a massive attack on the compound. The assault on the night of 19-20 March used about 40 cruise missiles fired from four ships and two submarines, along with two 1,000-kilogram bombs dropped by F-117A stealth strike aircraft.

(Continues…)

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Excerpted from "A War Too Far"
by .
Copyright © 2006 Paul Rogers.
Excerpted by permission of Pluto Press.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

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Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION,
1. WAR,
2. AFTERMATH,
3. THE INSURGENCY TAKES ROOT,
4. OVERSTRETCH,
5. THE ISRAEL FACTOR,
6. OIL AND THE WAR,
7. FALLUJAH,
8. NEXT: IRAN?,
9. ENDLESS WAR,
10. AFTERWORD – A WAR TOO FAR?,
INDEX,

Editorial Reviews

Praise for Paul Rogers's previous book 'Iraq and the War on Terror':

'Incisive, elegant, profound: if you want to understand what happened and why, you should start here.' George Monbiot 'Paul Rogers is a secular prophet for our troubled age. This analysis should be required reading in the Pentagon.' --David Loyn, BBC

'Paul Rogers has proved himself, time and again, to be a dispassionate analyst of events in Iraq...this is a must read.' --Tom Walker, The Sunday Times

From the Publisher