Being and Time

"What is the meaning of being?" This is the central question of Martin Heidegger's profoundly important work, in which the great philosopher seeks to explain the basic problems of existence. A central influence on later philosophy, literature, art, and criticism—as well as existentialism and much of postmodern thought—Being and Time forever changed the intellectual map of the modern world. As Richard Rorty wrote in the New York Times Book Review, "You cannot read most of the important thinkers of recent times without taking Heidegger's thought into account."

This first paperback edition of John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson's definitive translation also features a new foreword by Heidegger scholar Taylor Carman.

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Being and Time

"What is the meaning of being?" This is the central question of Martin Heidegger's profoundly important work, in which the great philosopher seeks to explain the basic problems of existence. A central influence on later philosophy, literature, art, and criticism—as well as existentialism and much of postmodern thought—Being and Time forever changed the intellectual map of the modern world. As Richard Rorty wrote in the New York Times Book Review, "You cannot read most of the important thinkers of recent times without taking Heidegger's thought into account."

This first paperback edition of John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson's definitive translation also features a new foreword by Heidegger scholar Taylor Carman.

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Overview

"What is the meaning of being?" This is the central question of Martin Heidegger's profoundly important work, in which the great philosopher seeks to explain the basic problems of existence. A central influence on later philosophy, literature, art, and criticism—as well as existentialism and much of postmodern thought—Being and Time forever changed the intellectual map of the modern world. As Richard Rorty wrote in the New York Times Book Review, "You cannot read most of the important thinkers of recent times without taking Heidegger's thought into account."

This first paperback edition of John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson's definitive translation also features a new foreword by Heidegger scholar Taylor Carman.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780061575594
Publisher: HarperCollins
Publication date: 07/22/2008
Series: Harper Perennial Modern Thought
Edition description: Reprint
Pages: 608
Sales rank: 32,283
Product dimensions: 5.50(w) x 8.30(h) x 1.30(d)

About the Author

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was born in Baden-Württemberg, Germany. He studied at the University of Freiburg and became a professor at the University of Marburg in 1932. After publishing his his magnum opus, Being and Time (1927), he returned to Freiburg to assume the chair of philosophy upon Husserl's retirement.

Read an Excerpt

Being and Time

Chapter One

Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein

The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein

We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine. These entities, in their Being, comport themselves towards their Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own Being. Being is that which is an issue for every such entity. This way of characterizing Dasein has a double consequence:

I. The 'essence' ["Wesen"] of this entity lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein]. Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). But here our ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity as "existence" [Existenz], this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the traditional term "existentia"; ontologically, existentia is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein's character. To avoid getting bewildered, we shall always use the Interpretative expression "presence-at-hand" for the term "existentia", while the term "existence", as a designation of Being, will be allotted solely to Dasein.

The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is [So-sein] which this entity possesses is primarilyBeing. So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house or tree) but its Being.

2. That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine. Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. To entities such as these, their Being is 'a matter of indifference'; or more precisely, they 'are' such that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite. Because Dasein has in each case mineness [Femeinigkeit], one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am', 'you are'.

Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine [je meines]. That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just as a property [eigenschaftlich], as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic -- that is, something of its own -- can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity -- when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment.

The two characteristics of Dasein which we have sketched -- the priority of 'existentia' over essentia, and the fact that Dasein is in each case mine [die Jemeinigkeit] -- have already indicated that in the analytic of this entity we are facing a peculiar phenomenal domain. Dasein does not have the kind of Being which belongs to something merely present-at-hand within the world, nor does it ever have it. So neither is it to be presented thematically as something we come across in the same way as we come across what is present-at-hand. The right way of presenting it is so far from self-evident that to determine what form it shall take is itself an essential part of the ontological analytic of this entity. Only by presenting this entity in the right way can we have any understanding of its Being. No matter how provisional our analysis may be, it always requires the assurance that we have started correctly.

In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution. But this tells us that if we are to Interpret this entity ontologically, the problematic of its Being must be developed from the existentiality of its existence. This cannot mean, however, that "Dasein" is to be construed in terms of some concrete possible idea of existence. At the outset of our analysis it is particularly important that Dasein should not be Interpreted with the differentiated character [Differenz] of some definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered [aufgedeckt] in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part. This undifferentiated character of Dasein's everydayness is not nothing, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being -- and back into it again -- is all existing, such as it is. We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein "averageness" [Durchschnittlichkeit].

And because this average everydayness makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity, it has again and again been passed over in...

Being and Time. Copyright © by Martin Heidegger. Reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. Available now wherever books are sold.

Table of Contents


Foreword   Taylor Carman     xiii
Translators' Preface     xxiii
Author's Preface to the Seventh German Edition     xxvii
Introduction: Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being     21
The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Question of Being     21
The necessity for explicitly restating the question of Being     21
The formal structure of the question of Being     24
The ontological priority of the question of Being     28
The ontical priority of the question of Being     32
The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being. Method and Design of our investigation     36
The ontological analytic of Dasein as laying bare the horizon for an Interpretation of the meaning of Being in general     36
The task of Destroying the history of ontology     41
The phenomenological method of investigation     49
The concept of phenomenon     51
The concept of the logos     55
The preliminary conception of phenomenology     58
Design of the treatise     63
The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being
Division One: Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein
Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysisof Dasein     67
The theme of the analytic of Dasein     67
How the analytic of Dasein is to be distinguished from anthropology, psychology, and biology     71
The existential analytic and the Interpretation of primitive Dasein. The difficulties of achieving a 'natural conception of the world'     76
Being-in-the-world in General as the basic state of Dasein     78
A preliminary sketch of Being-in-the-world, in terms of an orientation towards Being-in as such     78
A founded mode in which Being-in is exemplified. Knowing the world     86
The Worldhood of the World     91
The idea of the worldhood of the world in general     91
Analysis of environmentality and worldhood in general     95
The Being of the entities encountered in the environment     95
How the worldly character of the environment announces itself in entities within-the-world     102
Reference and signs     107
Involvement and significance: the worldhood of the world     114
A contrast between our analysis of worldhood and Descartes' Interpretation of the world     122
The definition of the 'world' as res extensa     123
Foundations of the ontological definition of the 'world'     125
Hermeneutical discussion of the Cartesian ontology of the 'world'      128
The aroundness of the environment, and Dasein's spatiality     134
The spatiality of the ready-to-hand within-the-world     135
The spatiality of Being-in-the-world     138
Space, and Dasein's spatiality     145
Being-in-the-world as Being-with and Being-one's-self. The 'They'     149
An approach to the existential question of the "who" of Dasein     150
The Dasein-with of Others, and everyday Being-with     153
Everyday Being-one's-Self and the "they"     163
Being-in as such
The task of a thematic analysis of Being-in     169
The existential Constitution of the "there"     172
Being-there as state-of-mind     172
Fear as a mode of state-of-mind     179
Being-there as understanding     182
Understanding and interpretation     188
Assertion as a derivative mode of interpretation     195
Being-there and discourse. Language     203
The everyday Being of the "there", and the falling of Dasein     210
Idle talk     211
Curiosity     214
Ambiguity     217
Falling and thrownness     219
Care as the Being of Dasein     225
The question of the primordial totality of Dasein's structural whole     225
The basic state-of-mind of anxiety as a distinctive way in which Dasein is disclosed     228
Dasein's Being as care     235
Confirmation of the existential Interpretation of Dasein as care in terms of Dasein's pre-ontological way of interpreting itself     241
Dasein, worldhood, and reality     244
Reality as a problem of Being, and whether the 'external world' can be proved     246
Reality as an ontological problem     252
Reality and care     254
Dasein, disclosedness, and truth     256
The traditional conception of truth, and its ontological foundations     257
The primordial phenomenon of truth and the derivative character of the traditional conception of truth     262
The kind of Being which truth possesses, and the presupposition of truth     269
Division Two: Dasein and Temporality
The outcome of the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein, and the task of a primordial existential Interpretation of this entity     274
Dasein's Possibility of Being-a-whole, and Being-towards-death     279
The seeming impossibility of getting Dasein's Being-a-whole into our grasp ontologically and determining its character     279
The possibility of experiencing the death of Others, and the possibility of getting a whole Dasein into our grasp      281
That which is still outstanding; the end; totality     285
How the existential analysis of death is distinguished from other possible Interpretations of this phenomenon     290
Preliminary sketch of the existential-ontological structure of death     293
Being-towards-death and the everydayness of Dasein     296
Everyday Being-towards-the-end, and the full existential conception of death     299
Existential projection of an authentic Being-towards-death     304
Dasein's Attestation of an Authentic Potentiality-for-being, and Resoluteness     312
The problem of how an authentic existentiell possibility is attested     312
The existential-ontological foundations of conscience     315
The character of conscience as a call     315
Conscience as the call of care     319
Understanding the appeal, and guilt     325
The existential Interpretation of the conscience, and the way conscience is ordinarily interpreted     335
The existential structure of the authentic potentiality-for-Being which is attested in the conscience     341
Dasein's Authentic Potentiality-for-being-a-whole, and Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care     349
A preliminary sketch of the methodological step from the definition of Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole to the laying-bare of temporality as a phenomenon     349
Anticipatory resoluteness as the way in which Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has existentiell authenticity     352
The hermeneutical situation at which we have arrived for Interpreting the meaning of the Being of care; and the methodological character of the existential analytic in general     358
Care and selfhood     364
Temporality as the ontological meaning of care     370
Dasein's temporality and the tasks arising there-from of repeating the existential analysis in a more primordial manner     380
Temporality and Everydayness     383
The basic content of Dasein's existential constitution, and a preliminary sketch of the temporal Interpretation of it     383
The temporality of disclosedness in general     384
The temporality of understanding     385
The temporality of state-of-mind     389
The temporality of falling     396
The temporality of discourse     400
The temporality of Being-in-the-world and the problem of the transcendence of the world     401
The temporality of circumspective concern     403
The temporal meaning of the way in which circumspective concern becomes modified into the theoretical discovery of the present-at-hand within-the-world     408
The temporal problem of the transcendence of the world      415
The temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein     418
The temporal meaning of Dasein's everydayness     421
Temporality and Historicality     424
Existential-ontological exposition of the problem of history     424
The ordinary understanding of history, and Dasein's historizing     429
The basic constitution of historicality     434
Dasein's historicality, and world-history     439
The existential source of historiology in Dasein's historicality     444
The connection of the foregoing exposition of the problem of historicality with the researches of Wilhelm Dilthey and the ideas of Count Yorck     449
Temporality and Within-time-ness as the source of the ordinary conception of time     456
The incompleteness of the foregoing temporal analysis of Dasein     456
Dasein's temporality, and our concern with time     458
The time with which we concern ourselves, and within-time-ness     464
Within-time-ness and the genesis of the ordinary conception of time     472
A comparison of the existential-ontological connection of temporality, Dasein, and world-time, with Hegel's way of taking the relation between time and spirit     480
Hegel's conception of time     480
Hegel's Interpretation of the connection between time and spirit     484
The existential-temporal analytic of Dasein, and the question of fundamental ontology as to the meaning of Being in general     486
Author's Notes     489
Glossary of German Terms     503
Index     524

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