Beyond 'Trading up': Environmental Federalism in the European Union: The Case of Vehicle Emission Legislation

This study analyses the stringency of EU environmental regulations. Contrary to the proposition of an economic "trading up" of standards, the positive theory of environmental federalism which is developed allows for an examination of political mechanisms and the effects of regulation. Empirical results of the study of European and national decisions in EU vehicle emission legislation allow for the conclusion that the adoption of strict rules is viable, even in extreme sectoral cases where the industry concerned is economically and politically powerful. The distribution of costs across the industry and EU member states is the central mechanism which provokes strict and lax rules. In vehicle emission legislation, systematic differences between the regulation of CO2 and air pollutant emissions exist. Diesel particulate filters were introduced comparatively late as a result of a "Baptist-bootlegger" coalition of environmental associations and parts of the automotive industry.

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Beyond 'Trading up': Environmental Federalism in the European Union: The Case of Vehicle Emission Legislation

This study analyses the stringency of EU environmental regulations. Contrary to the proposition of an economic "trading up" of standards, the positive theory of environmental federalism which is developed allows for an examination of political mechanisms and the effects of regulation. Empirical results of the study of European and national decisions in EU vehicle emission legislation allow for the conclusion that the adoption of strict rules is viable, even in extreme sectoral cases where the industry concerned is economically and politically powerful. The distribution of costs across the industry and EU member states is the central mechanism which provokes strict and lax rules. In vehicle emission legislation, systematic differences between the regulation of CO2 and air pollutant emissions exist. Diesel particulate filters were introduced comparatively late as a result of a "Baptist-bootlegger" coalition of environmental associations and parts of the automotive industry.

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Beyond 'Trading up': Environmental Federalism in the European Union: The Case of Vehicle Emission Legislation

Beyond 'Trading up': Environmental Federalism in the European Union: The Case of Vehicle Emission Legislation

by George L Wybenga
Beyond 'Trading up': Environmental Federalism in the European Union: The Case of Vehicle Emission Legislation

Beyond 'Trading up': Environmental Federalism in the European Union: The Case of Vehicle Emission Legislation

by George L Wybenga

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Overview

This study analyses the stringency of EU environmental regulations. Contrary to the proposition of an economic "trading up" of standards, the positive theory of environmental federalism which is developed allows for an examination of political mechanisms and the effects of regulation. Empirical results of the study of European and national decisions in EU vehicle emission legislation allow for the conclusion that the adoption of strict rules is viable, even in extreme sectoral cases where the industry concerned is economically and politically powerful. The distribution of costs across the industry and EU member states is the central mechanism which provokes strict and lax rules. In vehicle emission legislation, systematic differences between the regulation of CO2 and air pollutant emissions exist. Diesel particulate filters were introduced comparatively late as a result of a "Baptist-bootlegger" coalition of environmental associations and parts of the automotive industry.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9783848730513
Publisher: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft
Publication date: 06/10/2016
Series: Policy Analyse Series , #8
Pages: 374
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 1.25(h) x 9.00(d)

Table of Contents

List of Figures List of Tables List of Abbreviations Zusammenfassung Abstract 1. Introduction 1.1 Positive and Normative Approaches of Environmental Federalism 1.2 Research Puzzle: "steady pace, but no race" in Vehicle Emission Legislation 1.3 Research Requirements 1.4 Methodology 2. Beyond "Trading up": Federalism in Environmental Regulation 2.1 Federalism and Regulatory Policy Outputs 2.1.1 The 'California effect' and its Political Factors 2.1.2 Effects of Federalism in Environmental Regulation: the US Example 2.2 Politics of Regulation 2.3 A Positive Theory of Environmental Federalism 2.3.1 Environmental Goods 2.3.2 Inter- and Intrastate Federalism 2.3.3 Politics in Systems of Environmental Federalism 2.3.3.1 Territorial Distribution of the Industry 2.3.3.2 Public Representation of Environmental Interests 2.3.3.3 Inter- and Intragovemmental Relations 2.3.3.4. Interest Group Politics 2.4. Conclusion 3. The European Union against Federal Premises: Truly Intrastate? 3.1. Self-rule and Shared Rule 3.2. EU Public Policy Formation 3.3. Pressure Politics and Private Interest Government 3.4. Member State Policy Autonomy 3.5. Conclusion 4. Environmental Federalism in the European Union 4.1. EU and Member States in Environmental Regulation 4.2. Actors, Interests and Modes of Interaction 4.3. Regulatory Effects of European Environmental Federalism 4.3.1. Intergovernmental Relations 4.3.2. Federal Government and Member State Representation 4.3.3. Inteest Group Politics 4.3.4. Member State Policies 4.4. Case Study: European Vehicle Emission Legislation 4.4.1. Air Pollution and Vehicle Emissions 4.4.2 The European Automotive Industry in the EU and Member States 4.4.3. Environmental and Economic Interest Groups 4.4.4. Antecedents: From UN ECE to the Luxembourg Compromise 5. Conditional 'co-decision effects' in EU Vehicle Emission Policies (Case I) 5.1. The 'Euro' Standards: Ratcheting Upwards? 5.2. Public Actor Constellations in EU Legislative Decision-making in the 1990s 5.3. Conditional Impacts osa Bicameral Legislature: 'Euro 5' and 'Euro6' 5.3.1. Rule Formulation by the European Commission 5.3.2. Actor Constellations in the Council of Ministers 5.3.3. EP and Council: Inter-institutional Relations under 1st Reading Agreements 5.4. Conclusion 6. Introduction of Diesel Filters: Baptist-bootlegger Coalition across Lead Markets (Case II) 6.1. The 'Euro 5' Standard: Enforcement of a Technological Solution 6.2. Interest Intermediation at the EU Level of Government 6.3. National Environmental Campaign "No diesel without a filter" 6.4. Conclusion 7. 'Californian' Levels of Ambition? German Vehicle Emission Policies (Case III) 7.1. Environmental Policies and Institutions in Germany 7.2. Institutional Regime 7.3. Antecedents Policies prior to Centralisation 7.4. Geman Vehicle Emission Policies 7.4.1. Incentives for Diesel Filters: Federal Conflict and 'unusual' Retard 7.4.2. Latecomer anew: National Adaptation of Vehicle Tax to CO2 Emissions 7.4.3. Environmental Effects ofGerman Federalism? The Case of Ozone Law 7.5. Conclusion 8. Policies of another Producing Country? French Vehicle Emission Policies (Case IV) 8.1. Environmental Policies and Institutions in France 8.2. Institutional Regime 8.3. Antecedents: Policies prior to Centralisation 8.4. French Vehicle Emission Policies 8.4.1 Lack of Promotion of Diesel Filters 8.4.2. Persistent Support for Specific Drivetrains: the Bonus-malus CO2 8.4.3. The Failure of Low Emission Zones and EU induced Policy Change 8.5 Comparing French and German Policy Responses 8.6. Conclusion 9. Vehicle Taxes in the EU-15 Countries: Voluntary Harmonisation and Homogenisation (Case V) 9.1. Vertical Politics of Competence 9.2. Vehicle Taxation in the EU-15 Countries 9.2.1. Air Pollutants 9.2.2. CO2 Emissions 9.3. Environmental Problems and Policy Responses 9.4. Conclusion 10. Constitution and Effects of Environmental Federalism in the European Union 10.1. Intergovernmental Relations and Regulatory Competition 10.2. Differential Impacts of the Bicameral Legislature 10.3. Interest Group Politics, Consumer Goods and Issue Attention 10.4. Towards Administrative Federalism in Air Quality Regulation Appendix l Appendix II Bibliography

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