Congress Politics in Bengal 1919-1939 available in Hardcover, Paperback
Congress Politics in Bengal 1919-1939
- ISBN-10:
- 1843310635
- ISBN-13:
- 9781843310631
- Pub. Date:
- 01/01/2003
- Publisher:
- Anthem Press
- ISBN-10:
- 1843310635
- ISBN-13:
- 9781843310631
- Pub. Date:
- 01/01/2003
- Publisher:
- Anthem Press
Congress Politics in Bengal 1919-1939
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Overview
Set against the backdrop of major developments in the nationalist movement in Bengal, this study focuses on the nature of the interaction between the Congress, which represented mainstream political nationalism, and popular social groups whose politics was largely disorganized. In particular, it assesses the imapct that this interplay had on the nature of the Congress and the extent to which the provincial Congress organization was able to match its aspirations to those of the people, as it matured from a loosely-structured institution to an organized politica party.
Product Details
ISBN-13: | 9781843310631 |
---|---|
Publisher: | Anthem Press |
Publication date: | 01/01/2003 |
Series: | Anthem South Asian Studies |
Edition description: | First Edition, 1 |
Pages: | 256 |
Product dimensions: | 6.10(w) x 9.20(h) x 1.00(d) |
About the Author
Srilata Chatterjee has been a Lecturer of History at Behala College, Calcutta since 1996 and a Guest Lecturer at Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta since 1993.
Read an Excerpt
Congress Politics in Bengal 1919-1939
By Srilata Chatterjee
Wimbledon Publishing Company
Copyright © 2002 Srilata ChatterjeeAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-84331-063-1
CHAPTER 1
Bengal on the Eve of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movement (9 9-20)
I
In many ways the First World War was a harbinger of change in Indian politics. Economic dislocation, inflated prices and government control on trade increased the hardships of the people, making them increasingly conscious of the oppressive nature of the rule of their imperial government. In Bengal the intellectual element pondered over the cause-and-effect relationship between the political situation and the economic condition.
The Bengali popular press was particularly vocal against colonial indifference to the economic plight of the people. The Viswamitra thought that 'subjugation was the real cause of famine because the commercial policy of the government enabled the foreigners to exploit the land'. The Hitabadi too was of the opinion that the establishment of mills and factories had not benefited India and the artisan class was growing poorer. Dainik Bharatmitra argued that prospect of British capitalists opening more factories would mean further systematic exploitation. Samyavadi felt that to eliminate India's poverty it was necessary to ensure not only that the raw materials for manufacture came from India, but also that the manufacturers should themselves be Indians. British policy was held responsible for encouraging foreign exploiters and the Marwaris. The Bengali pointed out that the monopoly enjoyed by the Railways and the Steamer Company was the cause of high prices. The most insistent cry was against the export of rice. When the restrictions against interprovincial movements of rice crops were removed, it created a great stir. Demand for prohibition of exportation from Bengal was constantly reiterated. The middlemen were deplored for their avaricious attitudes, especially regarding the high prices of coal for which their activities were believed to be responsible.
The demographic curve in Bengal was shifting. The Census Report of 1921 showed that the population in Bengal had risen by 28.6 per cent since 1881. The annual rate of increase was 0.7 per cent. The rural population itself had increased by 27.6 per cent and by 1921 it stood at 44.38 million. But interestingly this trend of population growth was not noticeable in West Bengal, where the growth had been constrained due to malaria epidemics. In a span of 50 years until 1921, the population of rural Central and West Bengal had remained stagnant or even declined by 10 per cent as it had in Nadia and Jessore districts. Frequent attacks of malaria and other tropical diseases had sapped the vigour of the agricultural population. Agricultural production had also been adversely affected by 'the exhaustion of land of the moribund delta and by the mortality and morbidity of labour as a consequence of malarial infection'. In East Bengal the trend was towards a natural increase in population levels. By 1921 Dacca, Tippera, Noakhali and Faridpur had become very densely populated areas, with Bakarganj, Pabna, Bogra and Mymensingh closely following. The Muslim and the Namasudra peasants of the region had enterprisingly resorted to extensive cultivation. Labour intensive cash-crop production, especially of jute, had proved a lucrative source of income since 1870. However, this meant that by the 1920s nearly all cultivable land had been exhausted.
Between 1919 and 1921 annual agricultural surveys showed that the general condition of the people was not satisfactory. In 1920 excessive rain caused water-logging damage to low-land paddy in Northern and Eastern Bengal while a spell of dryness clamped over Western Bengal. The continuing high prices of basic necessities materially affected all classes of the population. The situation remained unchanged throughout 1921, as essential goods such as cloth and salt became more and more expensive. The depression in the jute trade meant little financial benefit for its cultivators. Moreover, there was considerable falling off in the area and outrun of the jute crop yielding less income to the farmers. The peasantry, ridden with misfortune, thus became very open to promises of change and better living standards in the days of Swaraj which, the leaders pledged, would come within a year.
While rural Bengal was facing the normal problems of natural hazards, demographic ups and downs, rising prices and above all an exceptional temporary crisis created by the war, their industrial compatriots were faring no better. The Bengal delta received the mass of its labouring population from the upper Gangetic plains. These men did not sever their connections with their native homeland. The Indian Factory Labour Commission of 1908 reported that 'the habits of the Indian Factory operatives are determined by the fact that he is primarily an agriculturist or labour on land. His home is in the village from which he comes and not in the city in which he labours.'
It is therefore natural that the labourers would be affected by the political and social upheavals in their villages. The recruits to the mills came from varied regions such as the Telegu speaking districts of Madras, Bihar, Central Provinces, the Uttar Pradesh and Orissa. There was only a small number of Bengali mill workers. Down the river from Calcutta, in the neighbourhood of Budge Budge and Uluberia, local men from the surrounding villages often came to work in the mills. In the mountainous tea estates the work force was mainly of Nepali extraction. In the Dooars tea gardens the labour force was made up of local aboriginals and coolies recruited from the Santhal Pargana. The labour force in the colliery region, especially in the Raniganj area, were aboriginal tribes mainly Santhals, or Kols or Hindus of inferior castes like the Baurias, Bhuias and Dushads. They cultivated their own lands and came to the coal fields in search of work only when their own fields did not require their attention and proved less remunerative.
From the middle of 1920 this labouring population of Bengal, simmering with discontent, which had hitherto been expressed in occasional outbursts, began systematic and planned opposition to the authorities. According to the Director of Industries, with a few exceptions, 'the strikes arose from demands for higher wages but the general origin of the demand was the rise in the cost of living which resulted from the Great War. The popular hope that the Armistice would be followed by a substantial fall in prices was grievously disappointed.' The causes of the strikes had been identified as economic. In the context of the pressure of high prices, the increase in wages in the preceding year had been neither sufficient nor uniform. Added to this was the general resentment against profiteering, practised freely by retailers and middlemen and the hatred for capitalist mill-owners who made large profits. The contrast between the affluence and comfort of the masters and the comparative poverty of the mass of workers naturally created ill will. This rancour was further stimulated when the masters justified their unruly behaviour by claiming racial superiority.
The labour strikes of 1920 can also be explained as a manifestation of an epidemic strike fever, which was 'partly engendered by worldwide political unrest, partly fostered by the frequent reports of labour trouble in England and Europe and to some extent also encouraged by political agitators in India'. As to the interaction between these striking labourers and the elite politicians, government reports stated that the non-cooperators recognized the efficacy of strike as a means of creating difficulties for the government. Individual members of the Congress did take an interest and an active part in promoting labour unrest. But even in these cases the politicians came to help the strikers only after an action had begun. As an institution, Congress did not adopt any resolution to support the labourers.
The social situation of Bengal in the early twentieth century, which so influenced the response to nationalist politics, also stemmed from the experiments with the social fabric introduced by the British under the Permanent Settlement. These created a multi-tiered social structure. In the rural areas of Bengal the zamindars, by virtue of their rights, headed the rural society. Between them and the lowest tenants stood a number of intermediaries who enjoyed social status and position according to their economic strength and their caste. The villages, although bound by traditional values, were not exactly living in an encapsulated condition. Urban capital and enterprise had been attracted towards land and a considerable section of the upper and middle classes had been making a living from land rents. Kinsmen of the landed gentry invariably migrated to the urban areas for better opportunities and earned their living in the professions. A process of interchange was thus maintained by the professional middle classes in the urban centres having kinship ties with the landed gentry.
The British apparatus of administration, moreover, by linking the entire region in a network, had closely knit the rural with the urban, leaving little scope for isolation. Judicial institutions created a class of lawyers whose close relation with the landed gentry in the country and the trading groups in the city, as well as their professional roles in the political trials, proved to be a useful leverage. Another imperial apparatus was the educational establishments set up at various levels to ensure the spread of education among the masses. The enormous numbers of teachers and students educated in these institutions at various levels, from village schools to the University at Calcutta, along with journalists and other professionals, created a new class of modern intelligentsia. This educated middle class helped to build up links between the city, the district towns and the villages. These links, forged over the course of a century, proved extremely vital in the dissemination of the spirit and message of nationalism in the Gandhian phase. Lastly, the growth of the transport system helped to remove territorial barriers and promote a rapid exchange of sociopolitical ideas.
In the tradition-bound social milieu of India, caste was a vital phenomenon, the influence of which extended into politics. In Bengal in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a considerable number of families of low ritual position increased their power and wealth and a main source of this strength was trade and agriculture. This process of upward economic mobility opened up new opportunities for the lower castes in the shape of Western education and new professions. By the second decade of the twentieth century, their numbers in government service and other professions had greatly increased. These affluent individuals often took part in the Local Board elections and local politics. By the early part of the twentieth century caste associations became a common feature of institutional politics. In general, the 'depressed classes' and their associations remained aloof from the drive for independence. They felt it to be a movement of the high caste Hindu bhadraloks with whom they felt no attachment. However, even within such caste groups reactions to the nationalist overtures sometimes varied. While the Namasudras of East Bengal openly refused to join and vehemently and actively opposed the movement throughout the colonial period, the Rajbansis of North Bengal occasionally got involved in the non-cooperation movement. The Tilis who in 1919 were avowed opponents of the anti Rowlatt-Bill agitation changed their attitude by the end of the 1920s. For most of the caste organizations, the anti-imperialist movements presented a dilemma as they now had to reconsider their loyalist stance.
The only caste that merged with mainstream nationalism in Bengal were the Mahisyas who constituted the most affluent segment of the agrarian population of Eastern Midnapur. But even among them the difference in the attitude of their caste associations and the general mass of the Mahisya population is noteworthy. While the former professed profound loyalty to British rule, the latter spontaneously participated in the movement for Swaraj and created history in Midnapur.
The organized lower-caste movement viewed the Congress as an organization of upper castes and therefore a potential danger in case of transference of power. The Bengal Provincial Congress Committee (BPCC) for their part took little or no initiative to change the character and composition of their organization by drawing the lower castes into their fold. Even in 1924-25, 69.4 per cent of the members belonged to the same social category. Perhaps the sole exception was a social reformer and a Congressite, Digindra Narayan Bhattacharjee who was associated with the Hindu Mahasabha. The Nagpur session of the Congress, however, did adopt a resolution to resolve the problems related to caste hierarchy within the Hindu society, so that no section felt alienated from the struggle against foreign rule. The resolution urged that 'to establish Swaraj within one year, settle disputes between Brahmins and non-Brahmins and make special efforts to rid Hinduism of reproach of untouchability'. As a result, 'the widespread belief was that caste equality was a principle of the non-cooperation movement'. But whether this belief yielded any result in Bengal in the first Gandhian mass movement was yet to be seen.
II
In the arena of institutional politics, the issue with which the Congress leaders were primarily occupied was the proposal for the Chelmsford Reforms. The special Congress session at Bombay (29 August-1 September 1918) had dismissed the Montagu-Chelmsford proposal as disappointing. But the response of the Bengal Congress leaders to the reforms was not unanimous. The younger generation of Bengal politicians including C R Das, Fazlul Huq, Byomkesh Chakravarti and Bipin Chandra Pal, differed with the confirmed Moderates like Surendra Nath Banerjee on the question of the reforms and the demand for full responsible government. The other bone of contention among the leaders was securing the control of the Congress. Fazlul Huq, Das and Byomkesh Chakravarti attempted to seize power in the Indian Association and then through it to establish their hold over the Congress. Failing this, they organized an All Bengal Political Conference and captured a majority in the provincial Congress committee when the Moderates failed to attend a meeting. They then cut off the representation of the Indian Association in the BPCC, as a result of which the Indian Association lost the right to send their delegates to sessions of the Congress.
Meanwhile, the Rowlatt Act evoked strong reactions from all sections of nationalists. Gandhi justified the Rowlatt satyagraha in opposition to the British Government on the grounds that they had disobeyed the will of God. All governments held authority by virtue of God's will. This government had lost the right to command obedience from its subjects who had the power to revolt. The satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act would 'purify the atmosphere and bring in real swaraj'. Moreover he also felt this was the only way to provide the rising generations, who could no longer be satisfied with only petitions and prayers, with an effective means of protest. 'Satyagraha is the only way, it seems to me to stop terrorism', he explained.
The Calcutta disturbances that occurred as an outcome of the Rowlatt satyagraha created a great stir in the popular mind. The day of the satyagraha (6 April) passed off without any trouble. In the afternoon a mass meeting was organized by C R Das and Byomkesh Chakrabarti on the maidan near Octerlony Monument. Although a crowd of 10,000 thronged the meeting, even the chief secretary had to admit that 'the proceedings were orderly'. Those who attended the meetings were chiefly upcountry Hindus, Marwaris, and the Mohammedans. The day of the satyagraha was marked by peaceful demonstration against the Black Act. But reports of Gandhi's arrest in the Punjab sparked off violence. Leaflets and handbills were circulated notifying the people of Gandhi's incarceration. One such leaflet intercepted by the police showed that it urged all communities to join in the protest against the Bill which 'has no need for the innocent Indians'. The northern part of the city observed a hartal as most of the shops as far south as Bow Bazar Street closed. Crowds began to collect on the streets and stopped the trams and other vehicles from doing business. The impact was the greatest in Burrabazar area where the shops were closed and bands of young men and boys chiefly Marwaris and Muslims paraded the streets, stopping tram cars and directing the passengers to alight. The Sikh taxi drivers refused to turn out. In the northern part of the town the tram services were curtailed when the drivers refused to work.
Throughout the day meetings were held and leaflets circulated urging the people to agitate for the release of Gandhi and the repeal of the Rowlatt Bill. According to the report of the Commissioner of Police R Clarke, the direct activists were 'small boys of the Marwari and Bhatia castes with a sprinkle of Mohammedans, but they were incited by others of more mature age who kept in the background'. The striking feature of this incident was the fraternization of the Marwaris, Bhatias and the Muslims. The climax was reached when the Hindus were freely admitted into the Nakhoda Mosque to participate in the meetings held there. 'In the early afternoon, a large crowd collected at the Nakhoda Mosque composed of Marwaris and Bhatias with a sprinkling of Mohammedans who had invited others into the courtyard of the mosque where they were served refreshments. No distinctions of caste were observed'. The assemblage was addressed by Byomkesh Chakrabarti. Another meeting was held at Beadon Square which was attended mainly by Marwaris, Bhatias and up-country men. The speakers were Byomkesh Chakravarti, Indu Bhusan Sen, Ambica Prasad Bajpai, Madan Lal Jarojia and Debiprasad Khaitan. They urged the audience to observe mourning and keep their shops closed for four days.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Congress Politics in Bengal 1919-1939 by Srilata Chatterjee. Copyright © 2002 Srilata Chatterjee. Excerpted by permission of Wimbledon Publishing Company.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements; List of Abbreviations; Introduction; Chapter I. Bengal on the Eve of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movement (1919-20); Chapter 2. Congress Organization in Bengal 1921-22; Chapter 3. Congress and the Masses: The Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movement in Bengal 1920-22; Chapter 4. Congress in the Post Non-Cooperation Period, 1922-29; Chapter 5. Civil Disobedience Movement in Bengal, 1930-34; Chapter 6. Congress in Electoral Politics and After; 1935-39; Conclusion; Glossary; Bibliography; Appendix; Notes; Index