Crimes and Punishments: An Analysis of Retaliation under the WTO

by Robert Lawrence

Overview

One of the unique aspects of the WTO as an international organization is that it authorizes members to retaliate against violations by raising tariffs. These authorizations have become increasingly common and increasingly controversial. In this analysis of the retaliation system, Robert Lawrence considers the guiding principles that govern responses to WTO violations, examines how these principles are implemented in practice, and considers options for reform.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780881323597
Publisher:	Peterson Institute for International Economics
Publication date:	10/15/2003
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	120
Product dimensions:	8.80(w) x 5.90(h) x 0.40(d)
Age Range:	18 Years

About the Author

Robert Z. Lawrence was a senior fellow and also the Albert L. Williams Professor of Trade and Investment at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He served as a member of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers from 1999 to 2000. He was the New Century Chair as a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution between 1997 and 1998.

Table of Contents

	Preface	ix
	Acknowledgments	xiii
1	Introduction	1
	Flawed System?	4
	Plan of the Book	7
2	Role of Remedies in the WTO System	13
	Preconditions	14
	The Reciprocity Paradigm	19
	WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A Deconstruction	30
	Agreement and Enforcement: Interdependent Arrangements	44
	Conclusion	46
3	Practice Makes Imperfect	49
	Perceptions	49
	Circumstances	50
	Discretion	50
	Measurement Problems	52
	Divergent Opportunity Cost	52
	Divergent Political Impact	53
	Legal Interpretations: The Exception that Proves the Rule	54
4	Imperfect Practice in the US-EU Trading Relationship	61
	The Only Game in Town	62
	Agriculture	66
	Health Standards	71
	Steel	73
	Tax Policy	74
	Conclusions	76
5	Options for Change	79
	Eliminate Rebalancing	79
	Allow Only Compensatory Liberalization	80
	Enhance Penalties	81
	Fines	84
	Preauthorized Compensation: Contingent Liberalization Commitments	86
6	Concluding Comments	91
	Protection	91
	Compliance	92
	Sovereignty	93
	Equity	95
	Final Observations	96
	References	99
	Index	103
	Boxes
Box 2.1	Settling disputes	27
Box 2.2	Prisoner's dilemma in trade negotiations	34