Football business: How markets are breaking the beautiful game

by Tsjalle Van Der Burg

Overview

The public face of football finance is the exponential rise of players’ wages, ludicrous transfer fees and escalating ticket prices. Season tickets at some north London clubs are already pushing £2,000. But the real picture is much more worrying. Clubs operate in a global market for sponsorship and television rights and the competition is fiercer off the pitch than it is on it. The beautiful game has been defiled by commercialism and greed. The fans are becoming increasingly irrelevant to the business of football as their great, historic clubs face crises caused by massive debt and incompetent financial management.

The only way that fans can regain a degree of control is by understanding how the business works, and that means understanding the underlying economics. In Football business Tsjalle van der Burg shows how the economics of football have developed and been corrupted. In a series of engaging stories he uncovers the mysteries of football finance. Van der Burg explains why if the 2013 English Premiership champions, Manchester United, had played their 1960 equivalent, Burnley, United would have won 158–1; why Feyenoord should be called Royal Feyenoord, and why politicians and media executives party while the fans walk alone.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781909652729
Publisher:	Infinite Ideas Ltd
Publication date:	08/29/2014
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	156
File size:	2 MB

About the Author

Tsjalle van der Burg teaches economics at the University of Twente in the Netherlands. He has a special interest in popularizing economics and has published on economic subjects in national newspapers and spoken on radio and television. Van der Burg, is a lifetime supporter of Feyenoord.

Table of Contents

Introduction Chapter 1 Made in the Past European not-for-profit organizations American entrepreneurs The 1960 All-Sports World Series The ‘third half’ Old soldiers never die Rules of the game Chapter 2 Money Does more money equal more attractive play? Cutting your coat according to your cloth Michel Platini and Financial Fair Play More money than is needed A football tax? The fears of the Ajax fan Wenger and Mourinho George Best or Robin van Persie? Royal Feyenoord Real Madrid, really royal? Towards the end of financial aid No exceptions, Mr Platini Simply the best Brother Walfrid and a social levy A ban on pay TV New owners In search of a soul Profits and fairness Fair pay for players Money – a curse or a blessing? Chapter 3 Dreams The most valuable things in life What should count most? Bill Veeck Grandstand Managers Day Chapter 4 No Equal Chances More chances for the big David and Goliath Lies, damned lies or good statistics? Making a choice Simple play is the most difficult The transfer system A foreigner rule Lessons from America Great American inventions How to get things done Europeans are less social now An American salary cap for Bayern Munich? Go your own way A progressive social levy Sadder but wiser Chapter 5 The League System Silvio Berlusconi and Rupert Murdoch A true Super League What the fans want Different clubs What different clubs want Money versus passion Tearing us apart Chapter 6 The Challenge An ever larger world The European Union A major democracy problem All the way from Brussels, to Celtic Park Will you walk alone? Index Online supplement available at www.in deas.com/football- business-supplement.

Preface

MADE IN THE PAST EUROPEAN NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS They were not like those ambitious, modern students who dream of founding their own multi-million company before they are thirty. No, they were not. Nathaniel Creswick and William Prest were different. When the two young men founded, on 24 October 1857, the first football club ever, they were not thinking of money. Sheffield FC was intended for fun. The club was an instant success. In the years before, games that were a lot like football had been played in the streets, on fields and in school playgrounds. So the new football club tapped into something big. Other clubs soon followed, as did a national Football Association, which launched a cup competition for England in 1871 – the FA Cup Tournament. The new sport also attracted a lot of spectators. In 1892, for instance, 25,000 people watched West Bromwich Albion win the Cup Final against Aston Villa 3–0. By that time, some of the players were being paid, which was officially permitted. In the beginning, the football clubs were voluntary organizations consisting of voting members and run by committees. But for the bigger clubs this soon proved unsatisfactory. They needed to borrow large sums of money in order to build large stands. Club directors had to stand surety for those loans, which meant they would have to stump up the money themselves if the club was unable to pay back the loan. That became too much of a risk. For this reason, in the period up to 1920, nearly all the clubs in the higher divisions were converted into limited companies with shareholders – because shareholders are not liable for the company’s debts if it goes bust. The first shareholders paid the club money in return for their shares to enable the club to invest. Those shares later entitled them to dividends. But the football clubs introduced a rule not known in other companies: there was a maximum for the dividends, and that maximum was fairly low. And actual dividends were on average lower still; in many cases, no dividends were paid at all. One did not become a shareholder to get rich from a club’s profits. In this way, until around 1980, almost all clubs basically remained not-for-profit organizations. What were the motives of the board members? Many were football enthusiasts who wanted to see their team win on the field and who liked to contribute to the fans’ happiness. Some were also motivated by the idea that the club had a positive effect on society more generally. And, of course, no director objected when his reputation was enhanced by association with the club. To be sure, there were also directors who used a club to promote their own business interests. After all, building a stadium was good business, and private companies could earn money through clubs in other ways too. Still, for most board members, such indirect profit motives were absent or, in any case, not predominant. Elsewhere in Europe comparable developments took place, albeit at a slower pace. For example, professional football began in France in 1932, and in the Netherlands as late as 1954. Each country had its own legal system which led to differences in organizational forms. For instance, some Dutch clubs were converted to foundations after the advent of professional football. In France the clubs remained associations of citizens for many decades, with local government being involved in the financing and administration of the clubs. This often included municipal ownership of the stadium. In quite a number of other countries such forms of government involvement were less important or did not exist at all. But one thing was the same everywhere in Europe: until 1980 almost no club was primarily interested in profit. The main aim was to offer people an enjoyable form of recreation. As such, it was not-for-profit organizations that made not only amateur football but also professional football. The pleasure derived from top-level football by tens of millions of television viewers and spectators before 1980 was basically down to the not-for-profit sector. This sector made a fantastic contribution to society. Around 1980 the scene started to change somewhat. Since then quite a few European clubs have come into the hands of new owners who have the statutory right to use the club to make profits for themselves. To what extent they use this opportunity is a question for later. A question for now is this: what would have happened if, back in 1980, the European authorities had stipulated that all football clubs must basically keep their traditional ownership structure? Part of the answer can be given here. Even without the new types of owners the stands would be well filled and the final of the top European cup competition would attract millions of viewers. Certainly clubs that now have rich owners, such as Chelsea, would not stand as good a chance of reaching the final, or even winning it. This is a shame for Chelsea fans, but it is also great news for other supporters. After all, a cup final is always between two clubs and only one can be the winner. That was true in 1872 and it is still true today.­ AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURS Whereas Europe experienced the rise of football in the nineteenth century, in the United States it was baseball that became popular. Baseball had an early start. It has been said that Rochester, New York, already had a baseball club in 1825. It had fifty members aged between eighteen and forty years old, who played the game during the afternoon. Over the next forty years many other clubs emerged. As in European football these early clubs were associations run by volunteers. Around 1867, however, the entrepreneur appeared on the scene. Soon most of the better teams were owned by individuals who used the team to make a living, if not a tidy profit. Other top teams were owned by commercial companies. The entrepreneurial model was successful in increasing attendances. As early as 1869 the Cincinnati Red Stockings sometimes played in front of 10,000 paying spectators. The club also paid all its players a salary that year. No English football club had yet reached that point. In 1871 a national baseball league was set up in the United States. One prominent owner was saloon-keeper Chris von der Ahe from St Louis. In 1881 he noticed that drinking establishments close to the ground of the local baseball team, the Brown Stockings, sold a lot of beer on match days. That inspired him. He bought the baseball club and built an amusement park with music, horse racing and a beer garden next to the ground. His entrepreneurial spirit inspired other club owners, and since then there have been many and varied entertainments on offer around the summertime baseball games. Since those days there have been many club owners who were motivated by the opportunity of making a profit from their club. Sometimes a club owner also owned another business, such as a broadcasting company, which benefited from profitable contracts awarded by the club. However, non-financial motives have also played an important role. Quite a number of owners were sportsmen who just liked to win. Others were just happy to be in the spotlight. In relation to such motives, many owners bought more top players than was actually good for profits. There were also men who regarded their ownership of the local team as a civic duty and who were interested in broader issues. For instance, owner of the Chicago Cubs, Phil Wrigley, did not allow night games in his park until 1988 because he did not want night-time noise and traffic in the neighbourhood. However, for most owners, profits were the primary motive and many did well in financial terms – although, as in any business, there were also losses from time to time. A baseball club needs rivals to play against. But an entrepreneur prefers to have as few rivals as possible, because it means higher sales at higher prices, and also less competition for the better players. So in 1876, a small number of clubs formed a national league with the rule that new clubs would only be permitted to join with the agreement of the existing participants. As a result only a few more teams would later join. They also agreed that there would be no relegation. After all, an entrepreneur would rather not risk losing income due to something as unpredictable as that. This old model still exists today. The national league competition, Major League Baseball, currently includes thirty clubs. An umbrella organization runs the league competition and sells the broadcasting rights to national TV stations. This generates a lot of money, which the clubs split between them. With the exception of New York, no city has more than one club in the Major League. This gives each club a monopoly within its city and far beyond. As a result, the club can demand high prices for tickets, merchandising and TV rights for regional broadcasters. Similar models exist in American football and basketball, sports which became popular later. A club in the highest league can move cities, which happens now and again. A city that offers big subsidies for a new stadium stands a good chance of getting a club, or keeping the ones they have. This can cost the city hundreds of millions of dollars. The owners win and the taxpayer is the loser – especially if he or she doesn’t like professional sport. But sports fans can suffer too, as fans of the Baltimore Colts discovered for themselves. The Colts played in Baltimore for years, winning many honours. They even won the Super Bowl. The club was much loved – rarely, so Americans say, has there been a bond between a club and its supporters like the one between the Colts and the people of Baltimore. All of this came to an end one sad night in March 1984. That evening hardly anyone knew what was about to happen. In the middle of the night, on the instructions of owner Bob Irsay, removal lorries rolled up to take away the contents of the stadium and move them to Indianapolis, where the team would play on under a different name. When Baltimore awoke the next morning it no longer had a football club. Arriving at the stadium members of staff saw to their bewilderment that almost everything had gone, from the office furniture to the dumb-bells. Years later Baltimore had still not recovered from the blow. On the streets you would see banners pleading, ‘Give Baltimore the ball’. Yes, entrepreneurship has its advantages, but it also has its drawbacks. THE 1960 ALL-SPORTS WORLD SERIES The moment came on 13 October 1960, at Forbes Field in Pittsburgh. During the seventh game of the World Series between the Pittsburgh Pirates and the New York Yankees, Bill Mazeroski hit a ninth-inning home run, winning the game for the Pirates 10–9 and their first World Championship since 1925. The 37,000-strong crowd erupted in a wild celebration, while the famous Yankees stood in disbelief. More than fifty years later fans still gather annually on the remnants of the old ball park to celebrate the anniversary of that legendary home run. And many Americans consider the Mazeroski game to be the greatest game of all time. Are they right? On 18 May of that same year, a 128,000-strong crowd at Glasgow’s Hampden Park saw Eintracht Frankfurt take the lead in the European Cup Final against Real Madrid. But, after 30 minutes of play, the time had come for Ferenc Puskás and Alfredo Di Stéfano to show off their superb skills in one of the best football demonstrations ever. Puskás scored four goals and Di Stéfano three, resulting in Real winning the game 7–3. During the entire history of the European Cup and Champions League finals, only four hat-tricks have been scored, and two of them were seen on that wonderful evening at Hampden Park. The usually careful newspaper, The Times, commented: ‘Real Madrid, with its brilliant performance on Scottish soil, has maintained the suggestion that it is the best team in the world’. But was The Times sufficiently careful? It would have been great if, in that golden year, Real Madrid had played the Pittsburgh Pirates in an All-Sports World Series, but due to some annoying differences in rules this was impossible. Now we will never know which team really was the best. Fortunately, it still is possible to have a contest between American baseball and European football on the field of economics. The golden sports year of 1960 is a good example for such a contest. Each of the two sports had been in existence for over a century, so it is not a question of young talent versus experienced professionals here. So which sport was performing best? The English first division, which at that time numbered twenty-two clubs, attracted some 14 million spectators in the 1959–60 season. This corresponded to an average of 31,000 spectators per match. Seventy clubs played in the three divisions below, and 18 million people came through the turnstiles to watch them. In total, the top four divisions in England attracted 32 million spectators – not including the popular cup games. Elsewhere in Europe, the grounds were respectably full too. In the United States Major League Baseball, which at that time numbered sixteen clubs, attracted some 20 million spectators in the 1960 season – more than the English first division, in other words. But the average number of spectators per match was lower: 16,000. This reflected the fact that a baseball club played more than 150 matches per year. In Minor League Baseball there were 155 clubs overall and a total of 11 million people paid to watch them. Added together, Major League and Minor League attracted 31 million spectators. That is slightly fewer than the 32 million for the top four English divisions. At that time American football and basketball were not yet very popular; the top leagues of these two sports together attracted fewer than 5 million spectators. Essentially, there were no more spectators in the United States than in England, whereas the United States did have four times the population; so the number of spectators per head of population in England was several times higher. The picture is similar when other European countries are included in the comparison, leaving only one possible conclusion: European football attracted many more spectators than baseball. Moreover, European sports fans paid comparatively little. For instance, the average ticket for a match in the English first division cost fourteen pence at 1960 prices while the average ticket for a Major League Baseball game was around one dollar and ninety cents. Taking into account the different values of the pound and the dollar, this meant that a baseball match would have set you back about three-and-a-half times as much as a football match. All in all, from the perspective of the sports fan, European football did much better than American baseball. Indeed, if all fans of professional team sports in 1960 had been asked whether Real Madrid or the Pittsburgh Pirates were the better team, in all likelihood the majority would have declared Real the winner. THE ‘THIRD HALF’ Now that the game is over the whistle for the third half can be blown. We still need to explain why the Americans lost and the Europeans won. To begin with the American entrepreneurs simply had bad luck. Let us be honest here. Baseball, the sport inherited by the entrepreneurs in about 1867 from the voluntary organizations, just happens to be more boring. Players stay in the same position most of the time. Unexpected actions are rarely seen and there is little room for genius. Perhaps baseball fans may not agree, but everyone can give his opinion in the third half and this happens to be mine. Whatever Americans may think of my opinion, the fact is that there is no scientific evidence that it is not true. Experienced third-half players will find it easy to put forward various other good ideas to explain why the Americans lost. The reasons may be speculative but, nevertheless, may hold some truth. Indeed, there are many things we do not know for certain and so a complete scientific explanation for the American defeat is out of reach. This being said, some other reasons for the defeat will be discussed below. To begin with it is not speculation to say that the high prices charged by American team owners had a negative impact on attendance. In this case the entrepreneurs were fully to blame. They created a closed league with a small number of clubs. Major League Baseball had only sixteen clubs in 1960 and they were dispersed widely over the country, with no town having two clubs. So no team had competitors located nearby. And, according to accepted economic principles, firms aiming for profits charge higher prices when they have fewer competitors. On the other side of the pond the smaller country of England had a system of promotion and relegation in which many different clubs could play in the top division – at least occasionally. As a result, the average English club faced more serious competition from clubs nearby. Consequently, there was a bigger chance that the stadium would be empty if ticket prices were too high. This is one of the reasons why English ticket prices were lower than ticket prices in the United States. Another, possibly more important, reason for low ticket prices was that the English clubs were not aiming to make a profit but had other objectives, among which were social concerns. Exploiting the fans was not regarded as socially acceptable. So, as long as the costs of running the clubs remained low, the clubs had a good reason to avoid high ticket prices. And costs were low indeed. The English clubs had low wage-bills. From 1901 the clubs had a maximum wage for players (which was abolished in 1961). In 1960 this maximum was about one-and-a-half times the wage of an industrial labourer. There was also a strict transfer system: when a player wanted to move to another club, his club had the right to charge a transfer fee, even if the player’s contract had expired. This weakened his negotiating position, which further contributed to low wages. Low costs made low ticket prices possible. In the United States there was also a (special kind of) transfer system, which was also strict and prevented wages from skyrocketing. But the American system had been introduced especially with the aim of increasing profits, and so it did not lead to lower ticket prices. All in all, the main reason for the higher ticket prices in the United States was that the club owners wanted to make money and had created a closed league system which helped to realize that goal. These higher ticket prices are at least one of the reasons for the lower attendances at matches in the US. Despite the high ticket prices, the American sports model, with its entrepreneurs, suited American culture, by and large. The Americans always understood that entrepreneurs wanted to make money. Indeed, a good entrepreneur was fulfilling ‘the American Dream’, that wonderful ideal of shoeshine boys who can become millionaires by seizing opportunities and working hard in the ‘Land of the Free’. And if, thanks to such entrepreneurs, many people got to enjoy baseball, it was also reasonable that they should be asked to pay for it. Of course, the supporters were not always satisfied, especially if their club moved to a different city. But essentially the entrepreneurial model suited American culture. And the European sports model suited European culture. Associations had traditionally been important. Anyone who wanted to play football could join an amateur club. Professional football grew out of amateur football and long remained connected with it. Young players usually came under the care of a youth coach at an amateur club. Was it right that this coach should have to pay high prices to watch a professional match which might feature one of his former pupils? Football owed its success to the efforts of volunteers. Viewed in that way it was only reasonable that tickets should be cheap. Throughout Europe low prices and packed stands reflected a culture marked by a certain solidarity. Europeans have more in common than they sometimes think. OLD SOLDIERS NEVER DIE In Europe professional football has given pleasure to a great many fans for more than a century now. But, despite its popularity, it has witnessed financial troubles throughout its history. For instance, many English clubs had monetary problems during the Great Depression of the 1930s, and a couple of clubs went out of existence at that time. Focusing on the last fifty years we see that the English clubs had especially bad times in the 1980s, when they encountered a fundamental crisis in terms of debts, mismanagement, stadium disasters, hooliganism and poor attendance levels. In France, the period between 1969 and 1974 was a particularly bad one, with many clubs in danger and a number of bankruptcies. And between 1982 and 1994 there was another period of financial deficits, augmented by corruption offences. Similar tales can be told about other European countries. How can these problems be explained? Since the beginning of professional football the situation for the clubs has been as follows. In order to please the fans, and directors who are sportsmen, the team has to win. To do so it needs good players. Good players can be costly in terms of wages, transfer fees and the costs of training and youth development. Therefore, it is important to earn money. To earn money it is crucial to have successes on the field. This increased the number of paying spectators. In more recent times it has also increases the number of television viewers and, in turn, the revenues from broadcasting. Successes on the field and large audiences also have positive effects on the revenues from merchandising and the contributions from sponsors and advertisers. Therefore, to a large extent, revenues depend on playing success. And this means that there is also a financial motive for spending large sums of money on players. However, if through misfortune or other causes the team loses a lot of matches, revenues will fall. This in turn will reduce the chances of securing good players and doing well on the pitch. In this way, a vicious circle is created, which some clubs have found themselves unable to get out of, causing them to lose touch with the top divisions for years – or forever. But even clubs that have not done badly on the pitch have had financial problems now and then, the reason being that spending on players was very high, while the big successes and revenues hoped for did not fully materialize. Of course, mismanagement has also played a role. There is no industry which has not seen bad managers, and football is no exception. On the contrary, it is a business where emotions, publicity and prestige are important and this has had a negative impact on the quality of management in some cases. On the other hand, there have also been directors who have put a great deal of effort into their clubs, taken sensible initiatives to increase revenues, hired good coaches and players without spending too much, and made their clubs very successful. Indeed, history has seen many failures, but it has seen many successful clubs too. Despite the fact that many clubs have had big financial problems, the existence of large clubs has been safe in most cases. All the big European clubs that existed in 1960 still exist today. And many of the small clubs with serious financial problems have also been able to survive, although some small clubs have had to leave the scene. Why do so many troubled clubs survive? In industries outside football it is normal to witness the disappearance of a company now and then. Life goes on. For instance, when a dairy goes bankrupt its customers simply turn to another milk producer. But when a football club disappears there is no good substitute for its fans and this creates a problem. Therefore, history has witnessed many efforts to save failing clubs. Such efforts have taken different forms. Some clubs have been rescued by sponsors, others by investors who obtained an ownership stake. In many countries local governments have rescued clubs. Some insolvent clubs have let their creditors agree on a reduction of their claims, sometimes under the threat of liquidation which would hurt the creditors even more. And some clubs have been liquidated but have re-formed soon after. This basically means that the club moves on without its old debts in the form of a ‘phoenix club’ with a slightly different name. In this way the creditors lose their claims. For the club the main disadvantage can be that, depending on the rules of the football association, it has to make its new start in a much lower league, because it has lost its old licence to play. But in any case, the club continues to exist. In 1961 the Italian club Fiorentina won the final of the European Cup Winners’ Cup, beating Glasgow Rangers 4–1 over two matches. Fortunately, Rangers managed to win the same cup eleven years later. In 2002 Fiorentina went bankrupt. Its assets were immediately bought by a new phoenix club called Florentia Viola in 2002 and called ACF Fiorentina since 2003 (when the club bought back its old name). The new club had to start three divisions lower, so it took some years to get back to the highest level. This was the chance for Rangers to prove they were the better club after all. And they did. They managed to exist for a further ten years, winning five Scottish titles during that time. It was only as late as 2012 that Rangers became bankrupt. In Glasgow there is also a phoenix club now, called Rangers FC. Old soldiers never die. RULES OF THE GAME The old days have gone. The time has come to turn to the real subject of this book: the economic problems that currently exist in European club football and those that may emerge in its future. The book is meant to be accessible for all kinds of readers. At the same time, parts of it meet scientific standards. In these parts, the main line of argument is given in the book itself, while the more detailed background information, which scientists require, is available in the online supplement. Readers with little time to spare are advised to ignore the supplement. Where does the book meet the scientific standards? We have come to the rules of the game. It may not be a fascinating subject but the rules must be made clear. Scientific standards are met whenever the book deals with economic questions, specifically the following four. First, what are the economic developments that occur or have occurred in football, how can they be explained and what could be the future economic developments? Second, what are the effects of these developments on the well-being of specific groups of people such as fans, players, club owners or taxpayers? Third, are there any policy measures which can improve the well-being of some of these groups? And fourth, what are the effects of the developments and policy measures on economic welfare? This brings us to another question. What is economic welfare? Economic welfare is a central concept in this book. It is the sum total of the well-being of all people in society, or in a country, expressed in terms of money. You may question whether well-being can always be expressed in monetary terms; this is a question for later. At this point, let me give a simple example to demonstrate the main idea. Consider an investment to improve the comfort of a stadium. Its costs amount to 10 million pounds. They are fully financed through a subsidy, that is, by the taxpayers. This means that the well-being of the taxpayers, expressed in monetary terms, is reduced by 10 million pounds. After all, these people have 10 million pounds less to spend on things that can improve their well-being, such as movies or ice-creams. Suppose the investment does not draw in larger crowds; the original stadium was sold out anyway. In addition, it does not lead to higher ticket prices. As you see, I am simplifying the problem here. Given this simplification, the only effect on the fans will be that they feel more comfortable in the stadium. This means that their well-being improves. But by how much? One could ask the fans how much they would be willing to pay for the higher comfort, if they had to pay for it. Suppose the question is asked and all fans give an honest answer. One fan says he is willing to pay 200 pounds (at the most) for the additional comfort over the course of several years; another fan says 320 pounds, and so on. After adding up all the amounts, one finds that the fans are willing to pay 12 million pounds in total. The improvement in well-being of the fans has been expressed in monetary terms as 12 million pounds. The effects of the investment on economic welfare are equal to the sum total of the effects on the well-being of all the people concerned. The well-being of the fans improves by 12 million pounds; that of the taxpayers is lessened by 10 million pounds. Twelve million minus 10 million is 2 million, so economic welfare improves by 2 million pounds. And an improvement in welfare in itself is a good thing, according to economists. In a similar way, the effect of any other investment, or any other change, on economic welfare can be analysed. Economic welfare is a neutral concept, in the sense that it does not matter who benefits and who pays. In the example given above, it is not important whether poor taxpayers mainly paid for luxurious seats for the rich, or whether wealthy taxpayers financed a stadium with standing accommodation only. As far as economic welfare goes, only the sum total of all benefits minus the sum total of all costs matters. Apart from economic welfare there are many other things that are important for society. For instance, some people will think that it is unfair that taxpayers pay 10 million pounds for the comfort of football fans and object to the subsidy for that reason. Some fans may think differently. Now, it is a task for the government, and for politicians, to deal with such differences in opinion. Economic science has little to contribute here. This is not to say that issues of fairness will not be discussed. They will, because they are important. However, the point is this: at every place where the book discusses fairness, it is not based on scientific arguments but is just expressing the opinion of the author. More generally, the book will discuss many questions other than the four economic ones mentioned above. Such questions may concern politics, social relations or other things. Whenever such issues are discussed the text does not (fully) meet the scientific standards. This does not mean the arguments make no sense. After all, science is not the only source of good arguments. Finally, some readers may come to think that my remarks about Feyenoord, the Rotterdam club, and the club of the people, do not satisfy the academic standards. Let me be frank: all statements concerning the first Dutch club to win the European Cup will be entirely correct. But my choice and assessment of these facts may be biased by emotion. After all, I am a human being and, more importantly, I am a Feyenoord fan.