Law, Language and Legal Determinacy

This book discusses one of the central problems in the philosophy of law—the question of legal determinacy. Is the law a seamless web or are there gaps? Bix argues that the major re-thinking of the common and "common sense" views about law that have been proposed by various recent legal theories is unnecessary. He offers a reconsideration of the role of language in the law, and the way ideas about language have been used and misused in recent legal theory. He explores in depth the relationship to legal theory of Hart's influential idea of "open texture," Dworkin's interpretative approach to law, and Wittgenstein's philosophy.

1016005131
Law, Language and Legal Determinacy

This book discusses one of the central problems in the philosophy of law—the question of legal determinacy. Is the law a seamless web or are there gaps? Bix argues that the major re-thinking of the common and "common sense" views about law that have been proposed by various recent legal theories is unnecessary. He offers a reconsideration of the role of language in the law, and the way ideas about language have been used and misused in recent legal theory. He explores in depth the relationship to legal theory of Hart's influential idea of "open texture," Dworkin's interpretative approach to law, and Wittgenstein's philosophy.

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Law, Language and Legal Determinacy

Law, Language and Legal Determinacy

by Brian Bix
Law, Language and Legal Determinacy

Law, Language and Legal Determinacy

by Brian Bix

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Overview

This book discusses one of the central problems in the philosophy of law—the question of legal determinacy. Is the law a seamless web or are there gaps? Bix argues that the major re-thinking of the common and "common sense" views about law that have been proposed by various recent legal theories is unnecessary. He offers a reconsideration of the role of language in the law, and the way ideas about language have been used and misused in recent legal theory. He explores in depth the relationship to legal theory of Hart's influential idea of "open texture," Dworkin's interpretative approach to law, and Wittgenstein's philosophy.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780198260509
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Publication date: 02/28/1995
Edition description: REPRINT
Pages: 232
Product dimensions: 5.38(w) x 8.50(h) x 0.56(d)
Lexile: 1670L (what's this?)

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION 1(6)
Language and Law 1(1)
Interpretation in Context 2(2)
Language and Context 4(2)
An Overview 6(1)
1. H. L. A. HART AND THE 'OPEN TEXTURE' OF LANGUAGE
7(29)
Hart's Discussion of 'Open Texture'
7(3)
Waismann's Discussion of 'Open Texture'
10(4)
Waismann and Wittgenstein
14(3)
Hart on 'Open Texture'--Revisited
17(1)
'Open Texture' and Judicial Discretion
18(4)
Hart on 'Open Texture'--In Conclusion
22(3)
'Gaps', 'Extra-Legal Sources', and Discretion
25(3)
An Overview of the Critics
28(8)
2. THE APPLICATION (AND MIS-APPLICATION) OF WITTGENSTEIN'S RULE-FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS TO LEGAL THEORY
36(27)
Introduction
36(2)
The Rule-Following Considerations-A Summary
38(3)
Disagreement and 'Forms of Life'
41(4)
Over-Readings of Wittgenstein I: Langille
45(5)
Over-Readings of Wittgenstein II: Patterson
50(3)
Hard Cases and 'Contested Concepts'
53(6)
Concepts and Conceptions
59(2)
Conclusion
61(2)
3. CLEAR CASES
63(14)
The Idea of Easy Cases
63(8)
Language and Discourse
71(2)
Language and Dialect
73(3)
Conclusion
76(1)
4. RONALD DWORKIN'S RIGHT ANSWER THESIS
77(56)
Introduction
77(1)
The Concept of 'Right Answers'
78(10)
The Scope of a Right Answer Thesis
88(8)
Incommensurability
96(10)
Interpretation and Disagreement
106(5)
Interpretation and Consensus
111(7)
Different Perspectives in Law
118(2)
The Role of 'Purpose'
120(9)
Intention and Interpretation
129(2)
Conclusion
131(2)
5. MICHAEL MOORE'S METAPHYSICAL REALISM
133(45)
Introduction
133(1)
Metaphysical Realism
134(3)
Summary of Moore's Position
137(3)
The Problem About 'Death'
140(6)
Changing Beliefs and Changed Concepts
146(2)
Wittgenstein's Critique of Metaphysical Realism
148(3)
Moore's Project: A Second Look
151(3)
Two Additional Criticisms
154(3)
Summary of Brink's Position
157(3)
Criticism of Brink
160(2)
The Kripke-Putnam Theory of Reference
162(6)
A Further Look at Natural Kinds
168(3)
Alternatives to Natural-Kinds Analysis
171(3)
Response to Moore
174(2)
Conclusion
176(2)
6. A SUMMING-UP
178(21)
Introduction
178(1)
Threads in the Rope
178(5)
On Intention in Law
183(7)
The Meaning of 'Law'
190(5)
The Status of the Claims and the Temptation of Relativism
195(4)
Bibliography 199(18)
Index 217
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