Table of Contents
Preface.- List of tables.- Acknowledgement.- Chapter 1: Introduction.- Chapter 2:Informal and Formal Contracts.- 2.1:Introduction.- 2.2:The Informal Contractual Arrangements in Wenzhou.- 2.2.1:Direct Private Borrowing.- 2.2.2:Borrowing through the Intermediary of Yinbei.- 2.2.3:Juhui.- 2.2.4:Direct Fund Raising by Enterprises.- 2.3:Formal Contractual Arrangements.- 2.3.1:Bills of Exchange.- 2.3.2:Documentary Credit.- 2.3.3:Secured Lending.- 2.3.3.1: Two cases.- 2.3.3.2:Statistical evidence.- 2.3.3.3:Questionnaire survey.- 2.4:Contract Law Enforcement and Economic Development.-
2.5:Conclusion.- Chapter 3:Contract Enforcement Revisited.- 3.1:Introduction.- 3.2:A Demand-side Analysis.- 3.2.1:Problems with Informal Contract Enforcement.- 3.2.2:The Nature of China’s Economy.- 3.2.3:Liberalization of the Chinese Economy and the Formal Law.- 3.2.3.1:Liberalization of the Economy.- 3.2.3.2:Liberalization of Economic Activities.- 3.2.3.3:Network Effects of the Formal Legal System.- 3.3:A Supply-side Explanation.- 3.3.1:Statistical Evidence.- 3.3.2:A Political Economy Explanation of the Supply-side Expansion.- 3.4:The Survey Results.- 3.5:Conclusion.- Chapter 4:The Role of Mortgages.- 4.1:Introduction.- 4.2:The Device of Mortgages and Formal Law.- 4.3:Mortgages Law and Bank Lending.- 4.3.1:The Legal Framework.- 4.3.1.1:The law of mortgages on immovable property.- 4.3.1.2:The law of mortgages on movable property.- 4.3.2:The Evidence and Explanations.- 4.3.2.1:Evidence on mortgage of immovable property.- 4.3.2.2:Evidence on mortgage of movable property.- 4.3.3:Questionnaire Survey.-
4.4:Conclusion.- Chapter 5:Protective and Non-Protective Functions of Law.- 5.1:Introduction.- 5.2:Inadequate Evidence in Dismissing the Role of Law in Economic Development.- 5.3:Signaling, Self-Commitment and Coordination.- 5.3.1:Signaling.- 5.3.2:Self-commitment.- 5.3.3:Coordination.-
5.3.3.1:Introduction.- 5.3.3.2: Coordination of the Listing of SOEs.- 5.3.3.3:Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law.-
5.3.3.4:Enforcement of Judgments.- 5.4:The Role of Government.- 5.4.1:Introduction.- 5.4.2:Government’s Role on SOEs.- 5.4.3:Government’s Role in TVEs.- 5.4.4:Government’s Role in the Provision of Public Goods.- 5.5:Conclusion.- Chapter 6:Explaining the Persistence of Authoritarianism.- 6.1:Introduction.- 6.2:Modernization.- 6.3:Cultural or Ideological Explanation.- 6.4:The Geo-political Variable.- 6.5:Resilience or Legitimacy.- 6.6:Review of Survey Results.-
6.7:Conclusion.- Chapter 7:Democracy and Economic Development.- 7.1:Introduction.- 7.2:The Relationship between Democracy and Economic Development.- 7.3:The Indirect Effects of Democracy on Economic Development.- 7.3.1:Rights to Property.- 7.3.2:Investment and Finance.- 7.3.3:Rule of Law.- 7.3.4:Education and Human Capital.- 7.4:Indirect Effects and One-Party Rule.- 7.5:Conclusion.- Chapter 8:Towards Deliberative Democracy.- 8.1:Introduction.- 8.2:Motivations Of Takeover Of Corporations And Governments.- 8.2.1:Motivations of Takeover of Corporations.- 8.2.1.1:Seeking Synergy.- 8.2.1.2:Disciplining Managers.- 8.2.1.3:Building Empire.- 8.2.1.4:Exploiting Stakeholders.- 8.2.2:Motivations of Takeover of Governments.- 8.2.2.1: Empire Building.- 8.2.2.2:Overthrowing Repressive Regimes.- 8.2.2.3:Improving Governmental Performance.- 8.2.2.4:Wealth Redistribution.- 8.2.3:A Comparison of the Motivations of Takeover of Corporations and Governments.- 8.3:Information and Expertise of Acquirers.- 8.4:Resources Used and the Possibility of Externalizing the Cost of Takeovers.- 8.5:Measurement of Success or Failure of Takeover of Corporations and Governments.- 8.6:Implications for Regime Choices.- 8.6.1:Legitimacy.- 8.6.2:Democracy.- 8.6.3:Performance.- 8.7:Conclusion.- Chapter 9:Conclusion and Future Options.-
9.1:Political Options.- 9.2:Economic Options.- 9.3:Rule of Law Reform Options.- Bibliography.- Index.-
