RETURNING THE DEEP ATTACK AS AN OPTION FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER
The purpose of this monograph is to study how the deep attack capability provides options to the operational commander and to show that a UAS pure deep attack capability increases operational flexibility and reduces operational risk. The monograph used operational art as the overarching framework for the discussion and specifically addressed operational risk, operational flexibility, deep operations, and options available to operational commanders. An analysis of the U.S. Army’s execution of deep operations in support of NATO’s Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo War and Operation Iraqi Freedom during the Iraq War from 2003 serve as the historical context for the Army’s lack of capability. Recommendations to regain the deep attack capability are informed by the U.S. Army’s Howze Board from 1962. In short, an unmanned aircraft systems pure deep attack capability will reduce operational risk, increase operational flexibility, and provide viable options to the operational commander necessary to achieve operational and strategic objectives.
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RETURNING THE DEEP ATTACK AS AN OPTION FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER
The purpose of this monograph is to study how the deep attack capability provides options to the operational commander and to show that a UAS pure deep attack capability increases operational flexibility and reduces operational risk. The monograph used operational art as the overarching framework for the discussion and specifically addressed operational risk, operational flexibility, deep operations, and options available to operational commanders. An analysis of the U.S. Army’s execution of deep operations in support of NATO’s Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo War and Operation Iraqi Freedom during the Iraq War from 2003 serve as the historical context for the Army’s lack of capability. Recommendations to regain the deep attack capability are informed by the U.S. Army’s Howze Board from 1962. In short, an unmanned aircraft systems pure deep attack capability will reduce operational risk, increase operational flexibility, and provide viable options to the operational commander necessary to achieve operational and strategic objectives.
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RETURNING THE DEEP ATTACK AS AN OPTION FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

RETURNING THE DEEP ATTACK AS AN OPTION FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

by John Brengle
RETURNING THE DEEP ATTACK AS AN OPTION FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

RETURNING THE DEEP ATTACK AS AN OPTION FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

by John Brengle

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Overview

The purpose of this monograph is to study how the deep attack capability provides options to the operational commander and to show that a UAS pure deep attack capability increases operational flexibility and reduces operational risk. The monograph used operational art as the overarching framework for the discussion and specifically addressed operational risk, operational flexibility, deep operations, and options available to operational commanders. An analysis of the U.S. Army’s execution of deep operations in support of NATO’s Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo War and Operation Iraqi Freedom during the Iraq War from 2003 serve as the historical context for the Army’s lack of capability. Recommendations to regain the deep attack capability are informed by the U.S. Army’s Howze Board from 1962. In short, an unmanned aircraft systems pure deep attack capability will reduce operational risk, increase operational flexibility, and provide viable options to the operational commander necessary to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Product Details

BN ID: 2940149075072
Publisher: ReadCycle
Publication date: 11/19/2013
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
File size: 212 KB
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