The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-39: A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War

by J. Maiolo

Overview

This book is an original study of the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the context of the ongoing debate about Anglo-German relations and the origins of the Second World War. Drawing on wide range of sources, the author casts new light on the diplomacy leading to the Anglo-German Naval Agreements of June 1935 and July 1937, and explores the crucial connections between naval intelligence, war planning and Admiralty policy. The author suggests that the Admiralty's response to the Nazi menace was far more rational and more complex than previous studies suggest.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780312214562
Publisher:	Palgrave Macmillan UK
Publication date:	07/15/1998
Series:	Studies in Military and Strategic History Series
Edition description:	1998
Product dimensions:	5.70(w) x 8.60(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Joseph A. Maiolo is currently Tutorial Fellow in the Department of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Table of Contents

List of Tables
• List of Figures
• Preface and Acknowledgments
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• The Naval Staff and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935
• Anglo-German Naval Relations, June 1935 to July 1937
• Naval Staff Perceptions of German Naval Strategy, 1934-1939
• Admiralty Technical Intelligence and the German Navy, 1936-1939
• The Naval Staff, British Strategy and the German Menace, 1934-1939
• The Naval Staff and the Defense and Foreign Policy, 1937-1938
• The End of Appeasement and the Bid to Transform Admiralty Strategy, 1938-1939
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Select Bibliography
• Index

Editorial Reviews

"...worthwhile reading for anyone interested in naval and related diplomatic affairs during the interwar period."--Paul G. Halpern, International Journal of Maritime History

From the Publisher

A study of the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the context of the ongoing debate about Anglo- German relations and the origins of WWII. Casts new light on the diplomacy leading to the Anglo-German naval Agreements of June 1935 and July 1937, and explores the crucial connections between naval intelligence, war planning, and Admiralty policy. Argues that the Admiralty's response to the Nazi menace was more rational and complex than previous studies would suggest. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

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