Symmetry and Collective Fluctuations in Evolutionary Games

by Eric Smith, Supriya Krishnamurthy

Overview

Evolutionary game theory has the potential to provide an integrated framework to model many aspects of evolution, development, and ecology. The reliable use of game models, however, requires an understanding of their behaviour when the number of players becomes very large, resulting in the emergence of thermodynamic limits. This behaviour is controlled by the symmetries that characterize the game, and the approach to the thermodynamic limit is governed by collective fluctuations in the actions of the players. In this book, the authors present methods to derive large-deviations limits for population processes, and apply these to game models illustrating the many roles of symmetry and collective fluctuations in evolutionary dynamics.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780750311373
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
Publication date:	02/05/2015
Series:	Code of Federal Regulations, Title 18 Conservation of Power
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	240
File size:	4 MB

About the Author

Eric Smith received the Bachelor of Science in Physics and Mathematics from the California Institute of Technology in 1987, and a Ph.D. in Physics from The University of Texas at Austin in 1993, with a dissertation on problems in string theory and high-temperature superconductivity. From 1993 to 2000 he worked in physical, nonlinear, and statistical acoustics at the Applied Research Labs: U. T. Austin, and at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. From 2000 he has worked at the Santa Fe Institute on problems of self-organization in thermal, chemical, and biological systems. A focus of his current work is the statistical mechanics of the transition from the geochemistry of the early earth to the first levels of biological organization, with some emphasis on the emergence of the metabolic network. Supriya Krishnamurthy received her BSc and MSc degrees in Physics from Hansraj College, Delhi University and I.I.T Kanpur respectively and a PhD degree, in Non-Equilibrium Statistical Mechanics, from the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Bombay in 1998. After her PhD she worked as a post-doctoral researcher in Paris at the Ecole Sup rieure de Physique et de Chimie Industrielles, at the Theoretical Physics Department of the University of Oxford and at the Santa Fe Institute. She has worked at the Swedish Institute of Computer Science SICS , Stockholm as a senior researcher (2004-2009) and as an Assistant professor at the Royal Institute of Technology at Stockholm (2006-2008). Currently she is an Associate professor at the Department of Physics at the University of Stockholm. She has also been associated with the Santa Fe Institute during 2005-2011 as external faculty. Her research interests include understanding both fundamental as well as inter-disciplinary applications of non-equilibrium statistical mechanics.

Table of Contents

Preface
1 Introduction: bringing together Darwinian evolution and games
2 Transmission, development, selection: the Price equation and the role of games
3 Extensive-form games: genomes to genes
4 Symmetry and collective fluctuations: large deviations and scaling in population processes
5 Discrete symmetries and emergent multiscale dynamics
6 Limit cycles and noisy clocks
7 Neutral directions and evolutionary entropy
8 Complex neutral spaces and “dressed” genes
9 One game theory