The Battle of Bull Run: July 21, 1861 [1884]
An article excerpted from "The Century" magazine, 1884; pages 80-106. — The Confederate commanding General's firsthand account and personal description of this early and significant battle of the War Between the States. It also includes a section designated "Subsequent Relations of Mr. [Jefferson] Davis and the Writer." Here one meets with many soon-to-become-famous names of Federal and Confederate personalities. Beauregard's personal philosophy regarding Confederate military and political strategies which he had advised and believed should have been used to ensure victory for the Southern cause are also discussed. — “The Federal attack, already thus greatly favored, and encouraged, moreover, by the rout of General Bee’s advanced line, failed for two reasons: their forces were not handled with concert of masses (a fault often made later on both sides), and the individual action of the Confederate troops was superior, notwithstanding inferiority in numbers, arms, and equipments, and for a very palpable reason. That one army was fighting for union and the other for disunion is a political expression; the actual fact on the battle-field, in the face of cannon and musket, was that the Federal troops came as invaders, and the Southern troops stood as defenders of their homes, and further than this we need not go.” (p. 102) — “As a military question, it was in no sense a civil war, but a war between two countries—for conquest on one side, for self-preservation on the other.” (p. 104) — “If that which was accepted as a last defensive resort against an overwhelming aggressive army had been used in an enterprising offensive against that same army while yet in the raw, the same venture had been made at less general risk, less cost of valuable lives, and with immeasurably greater certain results. The Federal Army of the Potomac would have had no chance meanwhile to become tempered to that magnificent military machine which, through all its defeats and losses, remained sound, and was stronger, with its readily assimilating new strength, at the end of the war than ever before; the pressure would have been lifted from Kentucky and Missouri, and we should have maintained what is called an active defensive warfare, that is, taken and kept the offensive against the enemy, enforcing peace. No people ever warred for independence with more relative advantages than the Confederates; and if, as a military question, they must have failed, then no country must aim at freedom by means of war.” (p.104)
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The Battle of Bull Run: July 21, 1861 [1884]
An article excerpted from "The Century" magazine, 1884; pages 80-106. — The Confederate commanding General's firsthand account and personal description of this early and significant battle of the War Between the States. It also includes a section designated "Subsequent Relations of Mr. [Jefferson] Davis and the Writer." Here one meets with many soon-to-become-famous names of Federal and Confederate personalities. Beauregard's personal philosophy regarding Confederate military and political strategies which he had advised and believed should have been used to ensure victory for the Southern cause are also discussed. — “The Federal attack, already thus greatly favored, and encouraged, moreover, by the rout of General Bee’s advanced line, failed for two reasons: their forces were not handled with concert of masses (a fault often made later on both sides), and the individual action of the Confederate troops was superior, notwithstanding inferiority in numbers, arms, and equipments, and for a very palpable reason. That one army was fighting for union and the other for disunion is a political expression; the actual fact on the battle-field, in the face of cannon and musket, was that the Federal troops came as invaders, and the Southern troops stood as defenders of their homes, and further than this we need not go.” (p. 102) — “As a military question, it was in no sense a civil war, but a war between two countries—for conquest on one side, for self-preservation on the other.” (p. 104) — “If that which was accepted as a last defensive resort against an overwhelming aggressive army had been used in an enterprising offensive against that same army while yet in the raw, the same venture had been made at less general risk, less cost of valuable lives, and with immeasurably greater certain results. The Federal Army of the Potomac would have had no chance meanwhile to become tempered to that magnificent military machine which, through all its defeats and losses, remained sound, and was stronger, with its readily assimilating new strength, at the end of the war than ever before; the pressure would have been lifted from Kentucky and Missouri, and we should have maintained what is called an active defensive warfare, that is, taken and kept the offensive against the enemy, enforcing peace. No people ever warred for independence with more relative advantages than the Confederates; and if, as a military question, they must have failed, then no country must aim at freedom by means of war.” (p.104)
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The Battle of Bull Run: July 21, 1861 [1884]

The Battle of Bull Run: July 21, 1861 [1884]

by Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard
The Battle of Bull Run: July 21, 1861 [1884]

The Battle of Bull Run: July 21, 1861 [1884]

by Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard

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Overview

An article excerpted from "The Century" magazine, 1884; pages 80-106. — The Confederate commanding General's firsthand account and personal description of this early and significant battle of the War Between the States. It also includes a section designated "Subsequent Relations of Mr. [Jefferson] Davis and the Writer." Here one meets with many soon-to-become-famous names of Federal and Confederate personalities. Beauregard's personal philosophy regarding Confederate military and political strategies which he had advised and believed should have been used to ensure victory for the Southern cause are also discussed. — “The Federal attack, already thus greatly favored, and encouraged, moreover, by the rout of General Bee’s advanced line, failed for two reasons: their forces were not handled with concert of masses (a fault often made later on both sides), and the individual action of the Confederate troops was superior, notwithstanding inferiority in numbers, arms, and equipments, and for a very palpable reason. That one army was fighting for union and the other for disunion is a political expression; the actual fact on the battle-field, in the face of cannon and musket, was that the Federal troops came as invaders, and the Southern troops stood as defenders of their homes, and further than this we need not go.” (p. 102) — “As a military question, it was in no sense a civil war, but a war between two countries—for conquest on one side, for self-preservation on the other.” (p. 104) — “If that which was accepted as a last defensive resort against an overwhelming aggressive army had been used in an enterprising offensive against that same army while yet in the raw, the same venture had been made at less general risk, less cost of valuable lives, and with immeasurably greater certain results. The Federal Army of the Potomac would have had no chance meanwhile to become tempered to that magnificent military machine which, through all its defeats and losses, remained sound, and was stronger, with its readily assimilating new strength, at the end of the war than ever before; the pressure would have been lifted from Kentucky and Missouri, and we should have maintained what is called an active defensive warfare, that is, taken and kept the offensive against the enemy, enforcing peace. No people ever warred for independence with more relative advantages than the Confederates; and if, as a military question, they must have failed, then no country must aim at freedom by means of war.” (p.104)

Product Details

BN ID: 2940011843150
Publisher: Strait Gate Publications, Charlotte, NC
Publication date: 11/24/2010
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
File size: 251 KB

About the Author

Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard (1818-1893): U. S. Army officer; Confederate General throughout the War Between the States; Confederate commanding General at the First Battle of Bull Run.
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