The U.S. Army in the war of 1812: An Operational and Command Study

by Robert Quimby

Overview

This two-volume work by historian Robert Quimby presents a comprehensive and detailed analysis of military strategy, operations, and management during one of America’s most neglected and least understood military campaigns, the War of 1812. With causes that can be traced to the epic contest against Napoleon in Europe beginning in 1803, the war itself was the first conducted by the young Constitutional government of the United States. Quimby demonstrates that failed American initiatives at the beginning of hostilities shattered the unrealistic optimism of the war’s staunchest advocates; and while initial failures were followed by military success in 1813, whatever advantage might have been gained was soon lost to incompetent leadership. Major exceptions occurred in the Old Northwest, and in what was then the Southwest, where U.S. forces finally broke the strength of the long-successful Indian-British alliance.  
      In retrospect, what occurred during the War of 1812 demonstrated the necessity for gaining citizen support before committing the nation to armed conflict; it also provided a series of object lessons on how not to conduct a military campaign. Finally Quimby argues that, notwithstanding several victories at war’s end, including the fabled Battle of New Orleans, American perceptions that the United States "won" the war are erroneous; at best the struggle ended in a draw. The United States Army in the War of 1812 is an up-to-date and long overdue reassessment of military actions conducted during a pivotal conflict in American history, one that shaped U.S. military doctrine for a half century.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780870134418
Publisher:	Michigan State University Press
Publication date:	02/28/1998
Pages:	446
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 2.70(d)
Lexile:	1270L (what's this?)

About the Author

Robert S. Quimby (1916-1998) was Professor of History at Michigan State University. Quimby wrote this two-volume history over twenty- five years and only published it near the end of his life. He is also the author of The Background of Napoleonic Warfare.

Table of Contents

	Preface	vii
	Key to Document References	ix
Part I	1812
1.	Introduction	1
2.	General Hull's Campaign	13
3.	The War in the East	55
4.	The Fall and Winter Campaign in the Northwest	89
I.	Securing the Frontier
5.	The Fall and Winter Campaign in the Northwest	123
II.	The Battle of Frenchtown
6.	The War in the South	147
Part II	1813
7.	Changes in Leadership	173
8.	The British Offensives in the West	183
9.	General Dearborn's Campaign	215
10.	Victory in the West	259
11.	Summer Doldrums in the East	301
12.	General Wilkinson's Campaign	319
13.	The Creek War	371
I.	Fort Mims to the Battle of Econochaca
Part III	1814
14.	The Creek War	449
II.	The Battle of Tohopeka to the End of the War
15.	Armstrong's New High Command	481
16.	General Brown's Campaign	497
17.	The British Offensive in the North	593
18.	The War around Chesapeake Bay	641
I.	To the Burning ot Washington
19.	The War around Chesapeake Bay	711
II.	Baltimore
20.	The War in the West	729
21.	General Jackson's Gulf Campaign	763
I.	Mobile and Pensacola
22.	General Jackson's Gulf Campaign	807
II.	New Orleans--The "Night Battle"
23.	General Jackson's Gulf Campaign	861
III.	New Orleans--the Main Battle
	Epilogue	953
	Appendix	961
	Bibliography	965
	Index	985

Editorial Reviews

A history of the 19th century war with Britain, focusing on the operations of the Army rather than the historical causes or repercussions of the war. Representative topics include General Hull's campaign, the Battle of Frenchtown, the British Offensive in the West in 1813, the Creek War, Armstrong's New High Command, General Jackson's Gulf Campaign, and the Battle of Tohopeka. The author covers naval operations only where they are directly related to the land campaigns. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

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