FREE SHIPPING on Orders of $40 or More!
Zombies and Consciousness
By definition zombies would be physically and behaviourally just like us, but not conscious. This currently very influential idea is a threat to all forms of physicalism, and has led some philosophers to give up physicalism and become dualists. It has also beguiled many physicalists, who feel forced to defend increasingly convoluted explanations of why the conceivability of zombies is compatible with their impossibility. Robert Kirk argues that the zombie idea depends on an incoherent view of the nature of phenomenal consciousness. His book has two main aims. One is to demolish the zombie idea once and for all. There are plenty of objections to it in the literature, but they lack intuitive appeal. He offers a striking new argument which reveals fundamental confusions in the implied conception of consciousness. His other main contribution is to develop a fresh and original approach to the true nature of phenomenal consciousness. Kirk argues that a necessary condition is a 'basic package' of capacities. An important component of his argument is that the necessary cognitive capacities are not as sophisticated as is often assumed. By focusing on humbler creatures than ourselves he avoids some of the distracting complications of our sophisticated forms of cognition. The basic package does not seem to be sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. What is also needed is 'direct activity' - a special feature of the way the events which constitute incoming perceptual information affect the system. This is an integrated process, to be conceived of holistically, and contrasts sharply with what is often called the 'availability' or 'poisedness' of perceptual information. This original, penetrating, and highly readable book will be of interest to all who have a serious concern with the nature of consciousness: not only professional philosophers and students, but also many psychologists and neuroscientists.
1118631442
Zombies and Consciousness
By definition zombies would be physically and behaviourally just like us, but not conscious. This currently very influential idea is a threat to all forms of physicalism, and has led some philosophers to give up physicalism and become dualists. It has also beguiled many physicalists, who feel forced to defend increasingly convoluted explanations of why the conceivability of zombies is compatible with their impossibility. Robert Kirk argues that the zombie idea depends on an incoherent view of the nature of phenomenal consciousness. His book has two main aims. One is to demolish the zombie idea once and for all. There are plenty of objections to it in the literature, but they lack intuitive appeal. He offers a striking new argument which reveals fundamental confusions in the implied conception of consciousness. His other main contribution is to develop a fresh and original approach to the true nature of phenomenal consciousness. Kirk argues that a necessary condition is a 'basic package' of capacities. An important component of his argument is that the necessary cognitive capacities are not as sophisticated as is often assumed. By focusing on humbler creatures than ourselves he avoids some of the distracting complications of our sophisticated forms of cognition. The basic package does not seem to be sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. What is also needed is 'direct activity' - a special feature of the way the events which constitute incoming perceptual information affect the system. This is an integrated process, to be conceived of holistically, and contrasts sharply with what is often called the 'availability' or 'poisedness' of perceptual information. This original, penetrating, and highly readable book will be of interest to all who have a serious concern with the nature of consciousness: not only professional philosophers and students, but also many psychologists and neuroscientists.
40.99 In Stock
Zombies and Consciousness

Zombies and Consciousness

by Robert Kirk
Zombies and Consciousness
Add to Wishlist
Zombies and Consciousness

Zombies and Consciousness

by Robert Kirk

Overview

By definition zombies would be physically and behaviourally just like us, but not conscious. This currently very influential idea is a threat to all forms of physicalism, and has led some philosophers to give up physicalism and become dualists. It has also beguiled many physicalists, who feel forced to defend increasingly convoluted explanations of why the conceivability of zombies is compatible with their impossibility. Robert Kirk argues that the zombie idea depends on an incoherent view of the nature of phenomenal consciousness. His book has two main aims. One is to demolish the zombie idea once and for all. There are plenty of objections to it in the literature, but they lack intuitive appeal. He offers a striking new argument which reveals fundamental confusions in the implied conception of consciousness. His other main contribution is to develop a fresh and original approach to the true nature of phenomenal consciousness. Kirk argues that a necessary condition is a 'basic package' of capacities. An important component of his argument is that the necessary cognitive capacities are not as sophisticated as is often assumed. By focusing on humbler creatures than ourselves he avoids some of the distracting complications of our sophisticated forms of cognition. The basic package does not seem to be sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. What is also needed is 'direct activity' - a special feature of the way the events which constitute incoming perceptual information affect the system. This is an integrated process, to be conceived of holistically, and contrasts sharply with what is often called the 'availability' or 'poisedness' of perceptual information. This original, penetrating, and highly readable book will be of interest to all who have a serious concern with the nature of consciousness: not only professional philosophers and students, but also many psychologists and neuroscientists.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780191536526
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Publication date: 11/10/2005
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
File size: 373 KB

About the Author

University of Nottingham

Table of Contents

1 Introduction 1

1.1 Two kinds of ignorance about prawns 1

1.2 The zombie idea 3

1.3 Outline 4

2 Zombies and Minimal Physicalism 7

2.1 Causal closure and epiphenomenalism 7

2.2 Redescription and strict implication 8

2.3 More about physicalism and strict implication 12

2.4 A posteriori necessity and physicalism 14

2.5 Psychological and physical explicability 17

2.6 Seeing whether descriptions fit reality, versus looking for analytic connections 19

2.7 Conclusion 22

3 The Case for Zombies 24

3.1 Kinds of zombies 24

3.2 Two old arguments 25

3.3 The argument from conceivability 27

3.4 Does conceivability entail possibility? 28

3.5 Chalmers's arguments for conceivability 31

3.6 The 'knowledge argument' 33

3.7 The argument 'from the absence of analysis' 35

3.8 Conclusion 36

4 Zapping the Zombie Idea 37

4.1 Conflict among intuitions 37

4.2 The jacket fallacy 38

4.3 The e-qualia story 39

4.4 E-qualia, causation, and cognitive processing 41

4.5 Are e-qualia alone enough for epistemic intimacy? 44

4.6 My zombie twin's sole-pictures 45

4.7 The e-qualia story is not conceivable 46

4.8 If zombies were conceivable, the e-qualia story would be conceivable 48

4.9 Objections 52

4.10 Sole-pictures versus soul-pictures 55

4.11 Corollaries 56

4.12 Looking ahead 57

5 What Has To Be Done 58

5.1 Varieties of consciousness 58

5.2 Nagel's two kinds of concepts 61

5.3 Three problems: (i) What is it like? (ii) Is it like anything? (iii) What is it? 63

5.4 Do we have to get a priori from physical facts to what it is like? 64

5.5 Must there be a third type of event? 68

5.6 Block's two concepts of consciousness 69

5.7 Do we need anew science? 71

5.8 Does this project involve 'conceptual analysis'? Does it involve armchair science? 72

5.9 More on the what-is-it problem 73

5.10 The moderate realism of everyday psychology 74

5.11 Summary 75

6 Deciders 77

6.1 What really matters? 77

6.2 Perception and control 79

6.3 Pure reflex systems 79

6.4 Pure reflex systems with acquired stimuli 82

6.5 Built-in triggered reflex systems 83

6.6 Triggered reflex systems with acquired conditions 84

6.7 Monitoring and controlling the responses 85

6.8 Deciders 88

6.9 Unity of the basic package 89

6.10 The basic package and perception 92

6.11 Usefulness of the basic package idea 95

7 Decision, Control, and Integration 97

7.1 Simple organisms 97

7.2 'Bees can think say scientists' 98

7.3 Interpretation, assessment, and decision-making by the whole organism 100

7.4 The human embryo, foetus, and neonate 102

7.5 The artificial giant 104

7.6 Block's machines 105

7.7 The machine-table robot 108

7.8 Untypical deciders 111

7.9 Other robots 115

7.10 An indeterminate case 117

7.11 Some lessons 117

7.12 Basicness of the basic package 118

8 De-sophisticating the Framework 119

8.1 The objection 119

8.2 The 'concept-exercising and reasoning system' 120

8.3 Concept possession is not all-or-nothing 122

8.4 More on having concepts 124

8.5 Representation 126

8.6 Concepts and theories 129

8.7 Mistaken beliefs and 'public norms' 132

8.8 The basic package and rationality 134

8.9 Deciders might be subjects of experience without being persons 134

8.10 The basic package and 'non-conceptual content' 135

8.11 The contents of deciders' informational states 138

8.12 Conclusion 139

9 Direct Activity 140

9.1 The basic package, control, and consciousness 140

9.2 Why the basic package seems insufficient for perceptual consciousness 141

9.3 The Evans-Type model 143

9.4 Concepts and the acquisition of information 146

9.5 Registration and conceptualization 147

9.6 Two points about information and registration 149

9.7 Directly active perceptual information: instantaneity and priority 150

9.8 A holistic approach to direct activity 154

9.9 Can we really understand direct activity holistically and not in terms of 'poisedness'? 155

9.10 Significance of direct activity 158

9.11 Degrees of consciousness and the richness of perceptual information 159

9.12 Phenomenal consciousness in general 160

9.13 Why is it like this? 161

9.14 Conclusion 162

10 Gap? What Gap? 164

10.1 Extending the sole-pictures argument 164

10.2 Zoëet; 166

10.3 Being able to tell the difference 167

10.4 Zoëet;'s abilities 170

10.5 Provisional conclusions 171

10.6 Some misconceptions 172

10.7 What this account does 174

10.8 Blindsight 175

10.9 Automatism 178

10.10 General objections to functionalist accounts 179

10.11 The 'explanatory gap' 186

10.12 Awareness of experiences 188

10.13 Carruthers's critique 189

10.14 'Worldly-subjectivity', 'mental-state subjectivity', and higher-order thought 192

10.15 More objections 193

10.16 Why there will always seem to be a gap 197

11 Survival of the Fittest 199

11.1 Scientific-psychological and neuroscientific accounts 199

11.2 Dualism and physicalism 201

11.3 Wittgenstein and Sartre 202

11.4 Behaviourism 203

11.5 Other functionalisms 204

11.6 Dennett on 'multiple drafts' and 'Joycean machines' 206

11.7 Pure representationalism 209

11.8 Higher-order perception 212

11.9 Higher-order thought 213

11.10 Core points 216

Bibliography 219

Index 227

From the B&N Reads Blog
Page 1 of

Related Subjects

Self-Help & Relationships
New Age & Alternative Beliefs
New Age & Alternative Beliefs - General & Miscellaneous
New Age
Self-Help & Relationships
New Age & Alternative Beliefs
New Age & Alternative Beliefs - General & Miscellaneous
New Age

Customer Reviews