Battle Story: The Battle of the Bulge by Andrew Rawson | eBook

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Battle of the Bulge 1944-45

By Andrew Rawson

The History Press

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Conceiving the Plan

Why was the Ardennes area so important to Hitler's plans? The Eastern Front was too extensive and the Soviet armies were too large for Germany to force an endgame in the east. While the Wehrmacht could afford to give up territory in the East, Hitler knew he would never be able to negotiate with Stalin. The Western Front was small enough for decisive action and Germany could not afford to lose the Ruhr, its industrial heartland, and the Allied armies were getting closer. The West Wall, a line of fortifications along its western border, was also an ideal position to hold with a thin crust of troops, allowing reserves to concentrate for the counteroffensive.

Hitler wanted to break through and then turn north, driving a wedge between the British and American armies. The advance would isolate British 21st Army Group in Holland from 12th U.S Army Group in Belgium, removing the threat to the Ruhr. The final objective was the port of Antwerp, which would be the Allies' main point of entry for supplies in Europe once the River Scheldt was opened to shipping. Its seizure would severely weaken SHAEF's situation on the Western Front and then negotiations with the Allies could begin. At least that was Hitler's plan.

By the middle of September it was an overstretched supply line rather than Rundstedt's capabilities or the tenacity of the German soldier which brought the Allied advance to a halt in front of the West Wall. While SS panzer divisions could be withdrawn immediately from the line, OKW West estimated that it would take until the end of October to withdraw the rest of the troops from the line. On hearing the news, Hitler set the target date for the attack as 1 November and he made it clear to Rundstedt that no ground must be given up in the meantime. It was a tall order for the new Commander in Chief.

Reinforcing the Wehrmacht

By September 1944 Germany had suffered over three million military casualties and untold millions of civilian casualties. The Third Reich's cities and industries were under constant air attack but Reich Minister Albert Speer was working on expanding the economy. The people carried on working in spite of the devastation but while new factories sprung up in the countryside it was becoming increasingly difficult to meet the Armed Forces' needs. It seemed that only Hitler was optimistic about the Third Reich's capabilities to launch an offensive in the West.

Rundstedt must have wondered where the troops would come from to launch such an ambitious attack but plans were already underway to find them. On 19 August Hitler instructed Walter Buhle, OKW's Army Chief of Staff, and Speer to organise enough men and materiel for the November offensive. Heinrich Himmler was also appointed head of a new 'Replacement Army' and he assembled eighteen new divisions and ten panzer brigades by taking men from the military staff and the security services. Although only two of the divisions were sent to the Western Front most of the new tanks, assault guns and artillery manufactured in the summer were sent west.

Hitler had to adjust the timing of the attack until late November to allow the recruitment of another 25 new divisions for an 'operational reserve'. OKW assembled many by recalling units from the Balkans and Finland to the Western Front. Joseph Goebbels also instigated a 'comb-out program', expanding the conscription age limits while lowering medical standards for men recovering from battle injuries.

The Navy and Air Force were also combed for able-bodied men and even the Nazi Party faithful who had so far avoided military service were called up. Employment exemptions were rechecked, new non-essential jobs were announced and many industries and agriculture were investigated with a view to replacing workers with concentration camp inmates.

Hundreds of thousands of new conscripts were found and then formed into new Volks Grenadier Divisions rather than strengthening existing formations on Hitler's insistence. The expanding Wehrmacht was looking impressive on paper but many divisions were below strength or short of tanks, transport, artillery and all kinds of equipment. The problem was that Hitler believed they were all at full strength and anyone who disagreed was accused of defeatism or treason.

By the time Hitler made his announcement on 16 September, his paranoia had led him to be involved in every major military decision, even getting involved in detailed planning. However, the role of the Wehrmacht's Chief of the Operations Staff must not be underestimated. Jodl turned the Führer's ideas into military plans and then made sure they happened. He also represented the Wehrmacht commanders, presenting their suggestions and objections to Hitler.

Although the German generals dare not speak out against Hitler, in private they were scathing of his plans for the Ardennes Offensive. Rundstedt later admitted that 'all, absolutely all, conditions for the possible success of such an offensive were lacking.' Field Marshal Model's reaction was blunter; 'This plan hasn't got a damned leg to stand on.'

Jodl Draws up Hitler's Ideas

Around 25 September Jodl was ordered to turn Hitler's idea for a counteroffensive into an operational plan. The plan had to fulfil eight objectives:

1 The attack would be launched by Field Marshal Walter Model's Army Group B

2 The attack would be made in the Ardennes in late November

3 Success depended on secret planning, tactical surprise and a speedy advance

4 The initial objective was to cross the Meuse River between Liège and Namur

5 The final objective was to capture Antwerp, cutting the Allied line in two

6 Two panzer armies would spearhead the attack with an infantry army on each flank

7 The attack would be supported by the Luftwaffe and many artillery and rocket units

8 The plan was to destroy the British and Canadians north of the line Antwerp – Liège

The Chief of the OKW, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, was hardly involved in the planning while Rundstedt was kept in the dark. Jodl did all of the work and came up with five alternatives:

1 Operation Holland: single-thrust from Venlo towards Antwerp

2 Operation Liège-Aachen: a double northwest thrust from northern Luxembourg and Aachen

3 Operation Luxembourg: a double attack from central Luxembourg and Metz towards Longwy

4 Operation Lorraine: a double attack from Metz and Baccarat towards Nancy

5 Operation Alsace: a double attack from Epinal and Montbeliard towards Vesoul

Operation Liège-Aachen was chosen and the main drive would be made through the Ardennes and Eifel areas. This double-pronged attack became known as the Big Solution. Jodl presented the outline plan on 19 October and three days later representatives from Rundstedt's and Model's forces were briefed about the operation at the Wolf's Lair.

Jodl's plan had Fifth Panzer and Sixth Panzer Armies leading Army Group B's attack while Seventh Army advanced in echelon on the south flank. Hitler promised eighteen infantry and twelve armoured (or mechanized) divisions and Hermann Göring promised maximum support from the Luftwaffe. Preparations had to be complete by 20 November ready to attack five days later. The timing was based on the high possibility of ten days of bad weather, in the hope it would cancel out Allied air supremacy.

The Generals' Reaction

Hitler had personally selected all Wehrmacht generals following the July Plot, choosing officers who were either subservient or hardened Nazis. None would, or even could, stand up against the Führer and he viewed their proposals and protests with suspicion. He was also involved in decision making at all levels and nothing could be changed without his permission, not even the movement of individual divisions.

While Rundstedt was an old school military general, Army Group B's commander, Field Marshal Walter Model, was a younger, politically motivated general. Relations between the two were frosty but they dealt with military matters in a workmanlike manner. However, the Führer's interference often meant that Rundstedt was often treated as a go-between, merely rubberstamping Army Group B's plans for approval by OKW.

Both Rundstedt and Model agreed that the objective was too ambitious for the troops available and that there was insufficient time to prepare for it. They were concerned that Army Group B would end up in a salient, with its flanks exposed to counterattack.

The Ardennes Offensive had two codenames. The one usually used was Operation Watch on the Rhine (Wacht am Rhein) but an alternative name was the Defensive Battle in the West (Abwehrschlacht im Westen). Both options had been chosen to make them sound like defensive plans.

Rundstedt and Model submitted their alternative plans to OKW during a meeting at Army Group B's headquarters on 27 October and they had come to the same conclusion, presenting what would be called the Small Solution. Rundstedt's Plan Martin had Fifth Panzer and Sixth Panzer Armies advancing on a narrow (25-mile-wide) front, north of the line Huy-Antwerp. It avoided the rugged Ardennes terrain and the distance to the Meuse was shorter, while there was good tank country beyond the river. A secondary attack north of Aachen and aimed towards Liège would rip open the Allied line.

Model's Plan Autumn Fog was broader (40 miles wide), and it covered the north half of Hitler's front. There would no second attack to the north, and spare troops would follow in a second wave; Seventh Army would also attack later on the south flank. Following the discussion Model amended his plan to match Plan Martin.

Hitler's directive was delivered to Rundstedt on 2 November and Jodl's covering letter made it clear who was in charge: 'The venture for the far-flung objective [Antwerp] is unalterable although, from a strictly technical standpoint, it appears to be disproportionate to our available forces. In our present situation, however, we must not shrink from staking everything on one card.' Rundstedt replied with his concerns about the shortage of troops and his doubts about the Wehrmacht's ability to hold on unless the US armies could be destroyed.

Arguments and discussions comparing the Small Solution against the Big Solution followed and while Hitler thought the Small Solution was too small, the generals believed they had insufficient resources for the Big Solution. There would be only one winner; the Führer.

Rundstedt also wanted a simultaneous two-pronged assault, to increase the impact of the offensive. Hitler disagreed and OKW's operations directive on 10 November forbade one. Although Rundstedt considered making a secondary attack from the Venlo area once the Allies started moving their reserves to the Ardennes, XII SS Corps was too weak to carry it out.

While Hitler's plans were coming to fruition in November, the Allies intervened with their own offensives and as Third US Army attacked in the Metz sector, First and Ninth US Armies attacked east of Aachen. During the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest it was obvious that divisions were being prevented from withdrawing to refit ready for the Ardennes. Rundstedt and Model believed that success at Aachen promised tactical success and they proposed counterattacking: 'A surprise attack directed against the weakened enemy, after the conclusion of his unsuccessful breakthrough attempts in the greater Aachen area, offers the greatest chance of success.' Hitler replied: 'Preparations for an improvisation will not be made.'

On 26 November Rundstedt and Model were still asking Jodl to change to the Small Solution but Hitler would not budge. Model even took his Panzer Army commanders, Joseph Dietrich of Sixth Panzer Army and Hasso von Manteuffel of Panzer Army, to Berlin to petition the Führer to change his mind on 2 December. He refused again. Four days later Rundstedt and Model submitted a final draft of their operations order detailing a second attack; Hitler again rejected the suggestion. He approved the final version of the operations order for Wacht am Rhein three days later. It was virtually the same plan that the Führer had conceived three months earlier.

CHAPTER 2

THE ARMIES

The Ardennes Battlefield

Hitler's chosen battlefield included some of the most difficult terrain on the Western Front. German troops had passed through it twice already, in August 1914 and May 1940, but they had advanced unopposed and during good weather on both occasions. The question was could mechanized forces move quickly through the Ardennes' forested hills in the middle of winter?

The northeast part of the battlefield is known as the Eifel and it has many villages and good roads running through its forests. The ridges east of St. Vith are known as the Schnee Eifel and the West Wall fortifications ran along their summit. To the east of Liège is the Hohes Venn, an area dotted with lakes and marshes.

In the north is the open and rolling countryside of the Low Ardennes. The Upper Ourthe valley is known as the Famenne Depression and it extends west through Marche and Rochefort to the River Meuse at Givet and Dinant. The High Ardennes to the south has many ridges and hills interspersed with narrow valleys and ravines. It is also dotted with villages and a patchwork of woods and forests. Control of the Ardennes road network was essential for success. There were few good roads and towns where they met, such as Malmédy and St. Vith in the north and Bastogne and St. Hubert in the south, had to be taken quickly so that supply columns could keep up with the advance. Most of the roads wound their way through narrow valleys or forests and they would force troops into columns to cross rivers and negotiate ravines. Traffic jams were likely and the anticipated poor weather would make them worse.

The German Commanders

Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt (1875–1953), commander of Oberbefehlshaber West (OB West)

Von Rundstedt was recalled to active service to command Army Group South during the invasion of Poland in September 1939 and he then commanded the invasion force which overran France in May 1940. After taking part in the planning of Operation Sealöwe, the invasion of England, he was given orders to develop the coastal defences of France and the Low Countries.

Von Rundstedt transferred to the Eastern Front in 1941, commanding Army Group South during its part in the invasion of the Soviet Union, codenamed Operation Barbarossa. Having led his troops deep into Soviet territory, he was sacked by Hitler in November 1941 after asking permission to withdraw from the Rostov area.

Hitler recalled von Rundstedt to duty in March 1942, placing him once again in command of the west. He failed to develop the Atlantic Wall, refusing to believe the Allies would land in Normandy and did not act on Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's advice to deploy his armoured reserve close to the coast. These decisions would cost OB West dearly and after the Normandy invasion in June 1944 von Rundstedt was sacked for daring to urge Hitler to negotiate with the Allies.

Von Rundstedt's replacement, Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge committed suicide in August after being implicated in the July plot to assassinate the Führer. Von Rundstedt was reappointed as the Allied Armies advanced. His first two tasks were to hold onto the West Wall and plan for a counter offensive in the Ardennes. Over the next three months he was at loggerheads with Hitler over the feasibility of Operation Wacht am Rhein.

Generalfeldmarshall Walter Model (1891–1945), commander of Army Group B

Model served as a chief of staff during the invasions of Poland and France but was given command of 3rd Panzer Division in November 1940, playing a leading part in Operation Barbarossa the following summer. He was promoted quickly and took command of XLI Panzer Corps as it attacked Moscow in October 1941 and Ninth Army in the Rzhev Salient the following January. His Army evacuated the salient in March 1943 and four months later Model was playing a leading part in the Battle of Kursk.

The Volks Grenadier Divisions were formed from younger and older men, using a cadre of returning wounded soldiers to train them. Although were at full strength in manpower, they were often short of weapons, armour and artillery, making them much weaker than a standard infantry division.

Model took command of Army Group North in January 1944, carrying out a fighting withdrawal from the Leningrad front. He did the same in command of Army Group North Ukraine in the spring and with Army Group Centre in the summer, becoming Hitler's favoured trouble shooter during the Soviet onslaught. Model transferred to the Western Front in August, taking over Army Group B as it faced annihilation in the Falaise Pocket. Although he briefly commanded OB West following Kluge's suicide, he returned to Army Group B and spent the autumn rebuilding it ready for Operation Wacht am Rhein.

The Allied Commanders

General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969), Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)

Eisenhower spent the first seven months of the war in Washington, first as Deputy Chief in charge of Pacific Defenses and then Chief of the War Plans Division. He then served as Assistant Chief of Staff heading the new Operations Division under Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall.

In June 1942 Eisenhower was appointed Commanding General, European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA) and in November 1942 also became Supreme Commander Allied (Expeditionary) Force of the North African Theater of Operations (NATOUSA) through the new operational Allied (Expeditionary) Force Headquarters (A(E)FHQ). He gave up command of ETOUSA to command NATOUSA and following the capitulation of Axis forces in North Africa, his command captured Sicily and invaded the Italian peninsula.

Eisenhower resumed command of ETOUSA in January 1944 and was appointed Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force a month later, taking over responsibility for planning the invasion of Normandy, France, in June, the operation codenamed Overlord. He was commander of the successful invasion of northern France, the eventual breakout across France, taking control of the forces which took part in the southern invasion in August. Eisenhower remained in command of all Allied forces until the end of the war, weathering the difficult battles for the West Wall, the Battle of the Bulge and the final drive into the heart of Germany. His command of ETOUSA, gave him administrative command of all US forces on the Western Front, stretching from the North Sea coast to the Alps.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from Battle of the Bulge 1944-45 by Andrew Rawson. Copyright © 2011 The History Press. Excerpted by permission of The History Press.
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