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THE LOGIC OF RELIGION

The Catholic University of America Press

Chapter One

The focus of this study is Western religion. The word "religion" is itself a Latin word, and its meaning is to be found in the classical texts where it is first employed. The concept itself antedates the word. We find extended discussions of religion in antiquity and later in the Middle Ages. In the chapters which follow, many authors could have been canvassed for their views, but it serves the purpose of this inquiry to consider the thought of a representative few, beginning in antiquity with Socrates, Plato, Cicero, and Seneca and then moving to the Middle Ages as represented by Augustine, Averroes, and Aquinas. By examining their analysis of religion, we gain insight into the nature and logic of religion before and after the advent of Christianity. Subsequent investigation will lead us to consider the work of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and G. W. F. Hegel. In their philosophies we find not only an account of the logic of religion but an appreciation of its implications in the social order.

This historical excursion is valuable because the history of philosophy is much more a part of philosophy than the history of science is a part of science. No one can proceed very far on his own philosophical reflection unless he first studies the history of the discipline. That history first appears as a chronicle of mutually destructive systems, but beneath the conflict one can find a thread of intelligibility. Western philosophy itself is a chronicle of Western man's grappling with the transcendent, both affirming and denying the reality of an immaterial order. The philosophers selected for consideration here have been chosen for their dogmatic significance, each representing an attempt to deal with the realm of being and subsequently of religion from a distinctive philosophical vantage point or methodology.

Questions of methodology and definition could easily absorb the whole of this brief volume. That said, a few remarks are nevertheless in order. This volume is not meant to provide a history of Western religion or to examine in detail the thought of any of the philosophers considered for discussion. Its purpose will be served by a cursory review of Greek and Roman attitudes toward the divine, followed by an examination of the distinctive features of Christianity and the use of Greek philosophy by the Fathers of the Church as they attempted to understand the message of the Gospel and the Hebrew Scriptures. Examined also is the split within Christianity occasioned by the Protestant Reformation, and finally the Enlightenment repudiation of Christianity itself. This study may be regarded as a survey of how believers and nonbelievers view the social phenomenon we call religion. Attention is briefly paid to selected Oriental modes of thought, some properly called religion in the Western sense, some more akin to philosophical rather than religious outlooks.

From a contemporary perspective the word "religion" may be difficult to define in such a way that it is applicable to all the phenomena which are popularly called religious. No one is likely to deny that Christianity, Judaism, and Mohammedanism are religions. Shinto is likewise a religion in the Western sense, but Buddhism and Brahmanism are not religions in the same sense although they are often called religions. Buddha's doctrine clearly advances an asceticism, but it is atheistic at its core, just as Brahmanism is pantheistic. Similarly, the trappings associated with religion are not to be confused with religion itself. Socially conducted ritual, symbolic and formal, need not be religious. The Japanese worship of the emperor, for example, is a patriotic not a religious act. The cult of reason fostered by Robespierre in the aftermath of the French Revolution was decidedly antireligious although its rituals mimicked Christianity. Thus, rites, vestments, temples, and moral teaching can be nonreligious as well as religious in character.

The title of this book, following the lead of Joseph Bochenski's brief work of the same title, has been chosen to distinguish it from many other philosophical works focused on religion. Readers will recognize that the term "philosophy of religion" is commonly employed as a title for books and college courses, but there is no agreement among authors with respect to the nature of the discipline. The concept of the discipline employed here, while not unique, is not shared by all who write under that title. A few preliminary distinctions are in order. First, the philosophy of religion is to be distinguished from the psychology of religion and the history of religion, even though the philosophy of religion necessarily draws upon the data or testimony supplied by those disciplines. In the view entertained here, religion is examined just like any other social institution. Its rational structure is to be examined, its origins explored, its doctrines established, its social value appraised. Philosophy does not pronounce on the truth of religion but rather observes, describes, and analyzes religious manifestations as objects in themselves. In examining the observed facts of religion as expressed in language and gesture, it suspends judgment regarding whether they actually refer to a transcendent reality. The act of religious faith comes within the scope of philosophical analysis only insofar as philosophy can examine the causes or grounds of the act of belief. But this type of inquiry is not to be confused with natural theology, sometimes called the "philosophy of God" or "theodicy." Some questions which traditionally were raised in natural theology (i.e., whether God exists, whether anything can be known of His nature) have in recent decades been addressed as if they were part of the philosophy of religion. To scan the contents of many books called the "philosophy of religion" is to find examinations of St. Anselm's ontological argument, St. Thomas's five ways, discussions of analogy, and examinations of "religious experience." Those discussions do not find a place in this volume.

Some philosophers, particularly those schooled in the British analytic tradition, begin their study of religion by focusing on "religious speech" or "religious language." This study does not because there is something more fundamental. True, the religious person uses speech in worship and in expressing himself with respect to the object of worship, but it is his intention, his insights which are to be examined. One may examine religious speech as one may examine the poetry of a given period in English history. It may be beautiful and effective, or it may not. The language employed by religious persons examined as poetry is a literary study, and while certain philosophical principles may be employed in its pursuit, it is not philosophy proper. Religion, it is acknowledged, can test one's theory of language. Whether God exists or not, given a conception of God as transcendent, one can ask how that transcendence can be captured in language, and the ensuing puzzle can challenge even the best minds.

There is obviously no one philosophical perspective from which to consider the nature of religion. Agreement on the nature of the discipline is no more to be expected than agreement about the parameters of the philosophy of science. Yet a philosophical perspective on religion should at least be definable, and a truly philosophical vantage point should prescind from subscription to a religious viewpoint. One may have difficulties in taking a detached view. One either is a believer or he is not. Similarly, one does not have to regard religion and its claims as something intrinsically absurd. Obviously, one's general philosophical outlook colors one's attitude toward religion. As one begins to analyze religion from a philosophical viewpoint, there are three basic positions one can take: that of the atheist, that of the agnostic, or that of the believer-although these positions are hardly ever pure. Thoroughgoing atheists are rare. There are few who philosophically argue that God does not exist. Most philosophers, if they do not affirm that God is, maintain simply that there is no evidence that he does exist. The believer, on the other hand, will affirm that God is-quite apart from evidence-though some believers may argue that this faith is well grounded because it is corroborated by philosophical reasoning. A thoroughgoing atheist, if he has a taste for the enterprise, might interpret religion in the light of his purely naturalistic categories. He might adopt a position similar to that of Fredrick Schleiermacher or Albrecht Ritschl, and, no doubt, much of what he would have to say would be interesting even to the believer. From any view, religion is a human invention, even though its object is God. Although the question "Does God really exist?" is an important one, one need not solve that question to philosophically enquire about the nature of religion. The question of God's existence belongs to the sphere of metaphysics. Granted, how one settles that question will determine one's personal attitude toward religion.

To return to the distinction between the philosophy of religion and the psychology of religion, although the two are not the same, they are frequently confused largely because the same question, "Why is man religious?" can be answered from both perspectives. The philosopher may seek the logical grounding of the assent which leads to the practice of religion; the psychologist may investigate the feeling of awe in the presence of mystery and speak about the needs of the subject. Answers are determined by the way the question is put, and that in turn depends upon one's prior metaphysical analysis. If there is no evidence for the existence of God, the psychological question becomes why does the religious mind go beyond the confused signs of the world? What is the psychological movement which carries it beyond the evidence? As we shall see, a logical analysis of belief is one theory; a psychological analysis for it is another.

A philosophy of religion should in principle allow that the assent, which is belief, might, in fact, be rationally grounded. A philosophy of religion should not, at least immediately, rule out the possible rational foundation of belief. If it is closed to that possibility, then it cannot take religious faith seriously and must regard the believer as one who has failed to use sufficient intelligence or discretion in the placing of his commitments. If there is not at the outset of an inquiry the conviction that belief may be rationally grounded, then the contrary attitude will undoubtedly prevail, namely, that belief is not rational. If one begins with that supposition, then obviously religious belief stands in need of criticism in order that it may be replaced or revised in the interests of intelligent behavior. The social structures or institutions grounded on such beliefs, even though they may have benevolent effects, are on shaky intellectual ground and should be exposed as such.

Another problem endemic to the philosophy of religion is the difficulty of talking about religion in the abstract. A common denominator to all that is designated "religion" is difficult to discern, and even where such identification is attempted, the product is frequently vacuous if not meaningless. No author for long successfully talks about religion in a general way. Usually the focus quickly shifts to Western religions and then narrows further to Christianity and Judaism, with occasional references to Islam. Apart from the inability to keep all religious manifestations in mind, or the value of doing so, authors usually do not have a stake in religion in the abstract. But Western man has a stake in the major Western religious traditions. Because of the historical and continuing impact of his traditions, he must come to terms with them in a way in which he does not have to come to terms with religion more broadly defined.

With deliberation this book is called the logic of religion. It doesn't require extensive empirical investigation to notice a certain logic or structure to religion wherever it is found. This is particularly true of the Western religions on which this book focuses. One does not need a philosophical analysis of religion to recognize that religion is founded on certain beliefs or that religious belief is only one type of belief. A religious act of faith has much in common with other acts of faith. We accept most of what we know on the testimony of others. We believe that Paris is lovely in the spring, that there is such an entity as the DNA molecule which is responsible for inherited traits, that Michelangelo is the sculptor of Moses. Few physicists have actually performed the experiments upon which the inference to the existence of K and P mesons is based, yet all would agree that propositions enunciating their reality possess at least a high degree of probability.

Belief is usually rationally grounded in the sense that the believer has some reason for assenting, even when he has mistakenly assented. Conviction usually follows the presentation of evidence or testimony. That evidence or testimony has to be both consistent and in accord with what is already known. Some reports are customarily viewed with great suspicion, i.e., that of an automobile whose engine possesses an amazing ratio of efficiency, or another program for the eradication of poverty, or a fail-proof method for teaching mathematics. Sometimes the language used to report discoveries in the sciences is so metaphorical that we do not readily assent to the reality of "right-handed matter" or "anti-matter" or "drops of electricity." Our curiosity might be aroused by such reports, but we withhold assent. Similarly, with respect to reports from the social sciences which contravene common sense, we withhold assent.

So also in the domain of religious affirmation we instinctively distinguish. While we might be able to understand the impulse which leads certain primitive tribes to endow a fetish or the elements of nature with diverse properties and even appreciate the beauty of their rites, still we would be reluctant to regard their beliefs as well founded. In matters of religion, we tend to discriminate between primitive cults and the great religions of mankind. Certain religions present themselves as credible, and we can understand why an informed and intelligent person might subscribe to their tenets.

To return to a point made above, Western religion is founded on belief in a god or gods. A philosophical analysis of religion may appropriately begin with a study of the nature of the act of assent to certain principles or propositions, namely, that there is a God, that reality consists in more than spatio-temporal-physical and mental events, that history is guided and controlled by nonhuman forces, that individual existence does not terminate with the cessation of bodily processes. Assent can be generated by philosophical considerations or by a more-or-less gratuitous act of faith. By faith is meant a personal act of assent to propositions acknowledged to be true but for which there is no evidence, scientific or otherwise. Faith may entail hope or trust in a person or in an institution, but intellectual assent to some articulatible truth is primary. A religious act of faith, although similar to other acts of faith, differs in its object (God) and in the conviction that, for at least some of its propositions, no evidence is yet forthcoming. There can be a natural religion generated through philosophical considerations, but because philosophy is limited to a few, there are not likely to be the necessary numbers to create a community of philosophical theists. A community of believers is required not only for religion to exist but for it to maintain itself, develop, and exert a social and cultural influence.

(Continues...)

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Excerpted from THE LOGIC OF RELIGION by Jude P. Dougherty Copyright © 2003 by The Catholic University of America Press. Excerpted by permission.
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