Nicholas Wapshott is the author of Keynes Hayek: The Clash That Defined Modern Economics and Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher: A Political Marriage. A former senior editor at the London Times and the New York Sun, he is now international editor at Newsweek. He lives in New York City.
The Sphinx: Franklin Roosevelt, the Isolationists, and the Road to World War II
eBook
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ISBN-13:
9780393245820
- Publisher: Norton, W. W. & Company, Inc.
- Publication date: 10/27/2014
- Sold by: Barnes & Noble
- Format: eBook
- Pages: 464
- File size: 630 KB
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Before Pearl Harbor, before the Nazi invasion of Poland, America teetered between the desire for isolation and the threat of world war.
May 1938. Franklin Delano Roosevelt—recently reelected to a second term as president—sat in the Oval Office and contemplated two possibilities: the rule of fascism overseas, and a third term.
With Hitler's reach extending into Austria, and with the atrocities of World War I still fresh in the American memory, Roosevelt faced the question that would prove one of the most defining in American history: whether to once again go to war in Europe.
In The Sphinx, Nicholas Wapshott recounts how an ambitious and resilient Roosevelt—nicknamed "the Sphinx" for his cunning, cryptic rapport with the press—devised and doggedly pursued a strategy to sway the American people to abandon isolationism and take up the mantle of the world's most powerful nation.
Chief among Roosevelt’s antagonists was his friend Joseph P. Kennedy, a stock market magnate and the patriarch of what was to become one of the nation's most storied dynasties. Kennedy's financial, political, and personal interests aligned him with a war-weary American public, and he counted among his isolationist allies no less than Walt Disney, William Randolph Hearst, and Henry Ford—prominent businessmen who believed America had no business in conflicts across the Atlantic.
The ensuing battle—waged with fiery rhetoric, agile diplomacy, media sabotage, and petty political antics—would land US troops in Europe within three years, secure Roosevelt's legacy, and set a standard for American military strategy for years to come.
With millions of lives—and a future paradigm of foreign intervention—hanging in the balance, The Sphinx captures a political giant at the height of his powers and an American identity crisis that continues to this day.
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Wapshott (journalist; Keynes Hayek) focuses on the personality and policy clashes between pre-Pearl Harbor American internationalists and isolationists, exemplified by Franklin D. Roosevelt on one side and primarily Charles Lindbergh and Joseph P. Kennedy on the other. Roosevelt, notably sphinxlike in his dealings with the press on whether he would run for a third term and in his impression of being noninterventionist while preparing for an eventual war, deftly neutralized potential rivals by appointing Kennedy as U.S. Ambassador to the UK and Lindbergh as a would-be but discounted military advisor. The author details how Kennedy and Lindbergh's bitter statements and proappeasement sympathies undermined their ambitions. Roosevelt's maneuvering is described favorably; Wapshott maintains it cemented his legacy as a wartime leader, however, he omits Roosevelt's later attempts at peacemaking after World War II. This narrative history largely synthesizes the work of other historians rather than mining archival collections. VERDICT The debate over American intervention in World War II is a popular subject among readers of all kinds, but scholars might prefer Susan Dunn's 1940: FDR, Willkie, Lindbergh, Hitler—The Election Amid the Storm or Lynne Olson's Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and America's Fight Over World War II, 1939–1941.—Frederick J. Augustyn Jr., Lib. of Congress, Washington, DC
Wapshott (Keynes/Hayek), the international editor at Newsweek, brings a British perspective to this narrative of F.D.R.’s successful outmaneuvering of the American isolationist movement in the run-up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, against the backdrop of his controversial run for an unprecedented third term. Wapshott demonstrates that isolationism was a comprehensive sentiment with deep roots in both parties. Joe Kennedy, Charles Lindbergh, and Alf Landon play featured roles as Roosevelt’s foils—in part a literary device enabling the personalization of a complex political process. But the hero of Wapshott’s story is F.D.R., the man who, after the Munich agreement, understood that the only question was “how soon America should prepare itself to take part” in a now-certain war. Pursuing that objective “was a tightrope walk between alarm and complacency, for which his complex and sophisticated character was ideally suited,” and success earned him the nickname of “the Sphinx.” Wapshott successfully unravels the complex sequence of negotiations, hints, half-promises, and cunning that brought Roosevelt the Democratic nomination, re-election to the Presidency, a massive rearmament program, and support for an embattled Britain—all within just a few years. In our current age of smashmouth politics, Roosevelt’s success in bringing critics and doubters on board seems his most remarkable achievement. (Nov.)
Ambiguity and uncertainty are major themes in this examination of Franklin Roosevelt's leadership in the years before Pearl Harbor.What's a politician to do? In 1941, 70 percent of the American public favored backing Britain against Hitler, even at the risk of war; 70 percent of the same public wanted to stay out of that war, encouraged by such prominent figures as Charles Lindbergh and the American ambassador to Britain, Joseph P. Kennedy. A year earlier, attitudes were much the same. Roosevelt became convinced that he needed to remain in the White House for an unprecedented third term to bring about the rearmament of a reluctant nation. Somehow, he had to engineer his nomination and election without providing an opening for a challenger from the isolationist wing of his own party. In this elegantly written account, Newsweek international editor Wapshott (Keynes Hayek: The Clash that Defined Modern Economics, 2012, etc.) depicts Roosevelt sowing confusion by encouraging no-hope candidates while remaining coy about his own future. As Britain's prospects deteriorated, he pushed constantly against the boundaries of the Neutrality Act with every ploy he could imagine, all the while denying any desire to take America to war—though his actual objectives remain uncertain to this day. The villains of the piece are Lindbergh, an anti-Semitic fascist sympathizer whose authoritative overestimates of Nazi strength bolstered those who argued that resistance to Hitler was futile, and Kennedy, an articulate, principled proponent of this defeatism. Though clearly no fan of the noninterventionists, Wapshott showcases their arguments with sufficient clarity to show that, while they proved to be on the wrong side of history, some of their concerns about the evolution of a permanently militarized state with an overweening executive have proved prescient. Though presented with a pro-Roosevelt tilt, this is history solidly researched and engagingly written. However, it is well-surveyed territory, and the author brings little genuinely new to the discussion.