International Trade, Factor Movements, and the Environment

by M. Rauscher, Michael Rauscher

Overview

This is a theoretical study of the relationship between international trade policies and environment policy, which has become a major theme in international policy disputes. Rauscher investigates whether free trade and globalizing markets are bad for the environment, or whether environmental policies can be used to improve international competitiveness. He also examines the political use of lax environmental regulation to help domestic producers.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780198290506
Publisher:	Oxford University Press, USA
Publication date:	05/28/1997
Pages:	352
Product dimensions:	6.37(w) x 9.50(h) x 0.97(d)
Lexile:	1390L (what's this?)

Table of Contents

Preface		v	(6)
List of Figures		xi	(2)
List of Tables		xiii
1. Introduction		1	(18)
1.1 Foreign Trade and the Environment: An Awkward Relationship		1	(5)
1.2 The Empirical Evidence: A Survey of the Literature		6	(9)
1.3 Organization of the Book		15	(4)
2. Basic Concepts and Definitions		19	(20)
2.1 Externalities, Property Rights, and Market Failure		19	(3)
2.2 Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Environmental Policies		24	(3)
2.3 The Endowment of a Country with Environment Resources		24	(3)
2.4 Ecological Dumping		27	(3)
2.5 Emissions as a Factor of Production		30	(4)
2.6 Elements of a Model of Environment and the Economy		34	(2)
2.7 The Dual Approach		36	(2)
Appendix: Properties of Linear Homogeneous Functions		38	(1)
3. Environmental Policy and International Capital Movements		39	(52)
3.1 Introduction		39	(2)
3.2 The Model		41	(1)
3.3 Explaining Patterns of Factor Mobility		42	(5)
3.4 Access to the World Capital Market: The Small Country		47	(5)
3.5 Effects of Changes in Environmental Policy		52	(7)
3.6 Optimal Environmental Policies		59	(4)
3.7 The Impact of the Policy Measure Chosen in the other Country		63	(2)
3.8 Cooperative versus Non-co-operative Equilibria		65	(5)
3.9 Capital Taxation as an Instrument of Environmental Policy		70	(5)
3.10 Political Factors Determining Environmental Policies in Open Economies		75	(2)
3.11 Non-competitive Market Structures and Optimal Environmental Policies		77	(3)
3.12 The Choice of Wrong Policy Instruments		80	(5)
3.13 Summary of Results		85	(2)
Appendix: Results for the Case of Emission Taxes		87	(4)
4. International Trade in Hazardous Waste		91	(31)
4.1 Introduction		91	(2)
4.2 The Model		93	(2)
4.3 Explaining the Patterns of Trade		95	(2)
4.4 Benefits and Losses from Trade in Toxic Waste		97	(6)
4.5 Effects of Changes in Environmental Policy and the Design of Optimal Policies		103	(5)
4.6 Environmental Policies when Foreign Emission Taxes Are Taken as Given		108	(2)
4.7 Co-operative versus Non-co-operative Environmental Policies		110	(5)
4.8 Trade Barriers as an Instrument of Unilateral Environmental Policy		115	(1)
4.9 The Issue of Market Power		116	(3)
4.10 Summary of Results		119	(1)
Appendix: The Gains from Trade in the Case of Emission Taxes		120	(2)
5. International Trade in Final Goods: The Case of Perfect Competition		122	(39)
5.1 Introduction		122	(3)
5.2 The Model		125	(1)
5.3 Autarky and the Patterns of Trade		126	(6)
5.4 Environmental Policy in the Small-Country Case		132	(4)
5.5 Pollute Thy Neighbour via Trade		136	(3)
5.6 Gains or Losses from Trade?		139	(3)
5.7 The Terms of Trade and the Environment		142	(4)
5.8 Environmental Policy in the Large-Country Case: Free Trade		146	(6)
5.9 Green Trade Interventions		152	(2)
5.10 Non-traded Goods and Environmental Dumping		154	(5)
5.11 Summary of Results		159	(2)
6. Imperfect Competition, Foreign Trade, and the Environment		161	(56)
6.1 An Overview		161	(1)
6.2 Monopolies, Foreign Trade, and Environmental Regulation		162	(9)
6.3 Environmental Policy and the Locational Decisions of a Monopolist Firm		171	(9)
6.4 International Oligopoly and Strategic Environmental Policy		180	(10)
6.5 International Oligopoly and the Strategic Choice of Environmental Product Standards		190	(11)
6.6 Monopolistic Competition and Intra-Industry Trade		201	(11)
6.7 Summary of Results		212	(2)
Appendix		214	(3)
7. The Political Process and Environmental Policy in Open Economies		217	(30)
7.1 The Problem		217	(1)
7.2 Representative Democracy and the Capture of Environmental Regulation in an Open Economy		218	(5)
7.3 A Partial-Equilibrium Model of Regulatory Capture		223	(5)
7.4 Optimal Environmental Policies		228	(2)
7.5 Lobbies that Influence Single Policy Instruments		230	(3)
7.6 Regulatory Capture of More than One Policy Instrument		233	(4)
7.7 Lobbying Activities in the Large-Country Case		237	(5)
7.8 Summary of Results		242	(2)
Appendix: Comparative Static Results		244	(3)
8. Intertemporal Trade and the Environment: The Foreign-Debt Problem		247	(25)
8.1 Introduction		247	(2)
8.2 The Indebted Country		249	(3)
8.3 Optimal Environmental Policies in an Indebted Country		252	(3)
8.4 Sub-optimal Environmental Policies		255	(2)
8.5 Inferior Consumption and Imported Inputs: Foreign Debt Can Reduce Environmental Problems		257	(4)
8.6 Debt Forgiveness: The Lender's View		261	(3)
8.7 The Economics of Debt-for-Nature Swaps		264	(3)
8.8 General Side Payment Schemes		267	(2)
8.9 Summary of Results		269	(1)
Appendix: Many Goods in the Debt Model		270	(2)
9. Implications of the Theoretical Analyses		272	(41)
9.1 An Overview		272	(1)
9.2 Summary of Results		272	(13)
9.3 Policy Implications for a Single Country		285	(10)
9.4 Regulation of Environmental Scarcity and Foreign Trade on the Supra-national Level		295	(17)
9.5 Epilogue		312	(1)
Appendix: List of Variables		313	(2)
References		315	(18)
Index		333